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REVIVING RELIANCE 
Ann M. Lipton* 
 
This Article explores the misalignment between the disclosure 
requirements of the federal securities laws and the private causes of action 
available to investors to enforce those requirements. 
Historically, federally mandated disclosures were designed to allow 
investors to set an appropriate price for publicly traded securities.  Today’s 
disclosures, however, also enable stockholders to participate in corporate 
governance and act as a check on managerial misbehavior.  To enforce these 
requirements, investors’ chief option is a claim under the general antifraud 
statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  But courts are 
deeply suspicious of investors’ attempts to use the Act to hold corporations 
liable for false statements related to governance. 
As this Article demonstrates, judicial skepticism can be traced to the 
functional elimination of the element of reliance from private investors’ 
claims.  Without the element of reliance, courts cannot discriminate between 
deception, which section 10(b) prohibits, and poor managerial decision-
making, to which section 10(b) does not speak.  Doctrines that courts 
developed to distinguish between the two now have the perverse effect of 
devaluing disclosures intended to facilitate shareholder participation in 
corporate governance.  More troublingly, they enforce a normative viewpoint 
that shareholders do not, or should not, have interests beyond the short-term 
maximization of a firm’s stock price.  This interpretation of shareholder 
preferences undermines modern regulatory initiatives that employ 
shareholders as a restraining force on antisocial corporate conduct. 
This Article proposes that courts adopt new interpretations of section 
10(b) that reestablish the centrality of reliance.  By doing so, courts can 
facilitate shareholders’ participation in the corporate governance structure 
and reward investors who inhabit the role of corporate monitor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal securities laws mandate that publicly traded businesses 
disclose material information to investors, and private litigation has long 
served as a critical mechanism for their enforcement.  Today, however, the 
required disclosures have outgrown the private causes of action, making it 
easier for businesses to evade their legal responsibilities.  Investors’ ability 
to monitor and influence corporate behavior suffers as a result. 
For many years, federally mandated disclosures were designed primarily 
to enable investors to set appropriate prices for publically traded securities.  
Investors were provided with basic information about the corporation’s 
assets, revenues, liabilities, capital structure, and the like for the purpose of 
allowing them to price the securities they traded.  In this manner, federal law 
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treated investors like consumers purchasing a corporate product, positioned 
as opposite and external to the corporate entity. 
Over time, however, investors changed, and the purposes of disclosure 
changed with them.  In the mid-twentieth century, most stock was held by 
individual retail investors.  Today, by contrast, 66 percent of publicly traded 
stock is held by institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, 
hedge funds, and insurance companies.1  These investors often have a 
substantial stake in particular firms.2  And unlike the dispersed, 
unsophisticated retail investors of days past, institutional investors have the 
expertise, the voting power, and the incentives to take a serious interest in the 
way that corporations are managed and to advocate for changes when they 
are dissatisfied with the current strategy.  They no longer need to be treated 
as counterparties to the corporate entity—instead they are, or have the 
potential to be, participants in the corporate governance project. 
Congress and federal regulators have responded to the shift.  Though state 
law has traditionally afforded few rights to stockholders—a state of affairs 
that many have criticized for enabling managerial abuse3—federal law has 
gradually increased stockholder power.  Among other things, Congress and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have enhanced stockholder 
voting rights, loosened restrictions on communications among stockholders, 
and granted stockholders greater access to the corporate proxy.  As part of 
these efforts, regulators have expanded the types of information to be 
disclosed to stockholders.  No longer is the focus solely on valuation.  Today, 
many mandated disclosures concern the corporation’s internal decision-
making processes and governance structures in order to facilitate greater 
shareholder oversight.4  In this manner, federal law enables shareholders to 
protect themselves against unfaithful or incompetent managers and provides 
them with sufficient information to exercise a voice in corporate affairs.  The 
federal regulatory scheme, in other words, has begun to enlist shareholders 
to serve as monitors of managerial behavior, and disclosure is one of its 
critical tools. 
Unfortunately, even though private litigation remains a significant part of 
the regime for enforcing federal disclosure requirements, it has not adapted 
to the changes.  Currently, there is no cause of action designed to enforce 
disclosures that are intended to assist shareholders’ involvement in corporate 
governance.  Instead, the only viable option is section 10(b) of the Securities 
 
 1. Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market 
Liquidity:  Trends and Relationships 7 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147757 [https://perma.cc/3FF4-
WRTU]; see also Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%:  Team Production 
Revisited, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 171–72 (2016) (reporting that in 1945, 93 
percent of equity stock was held by individuals and that in 2014, the figure was closer to 36 
percent). 
 2. For example, the Vanguard Group controls more than 5 percent of over 90 percent of 
the companies that make up the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. Sarah Krouse et al., Passive 
Funds Embrace Their New Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2016, at A1. 
 3. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
 4. See infra Part I. 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).5  Section 10(b) is a general 
antifraud statute, but it is narrowly aimed toward policing false statements in 
the context of valuation during a purchase or sale.6 
Even with its limitations, section 10(b) could be utilized as a backdoor 
method for enforcing governance-related disclosures;7 however, over the 
years, courts have built up a series of doctrines which prevent precisely that.8  
For example, the doctrine of puffery—treating certain types of disclosures as 
too vague to be material to investors—is often employed for the purpose of 
rejecting claims based on statements relating to corporate governance 
processes and quality.9  Additionally, section 10(b) damages are defined as 
the difference between a security’s purchase price and its true value at the 
time of purchase, disregarding how a continuing fraud may cause further 
damage over time precisely because it denies shareholders the opportunity to 
force an early course correction.10 
Many of these doctrines can be traced to a particular development in 
section 10(b) jurisprudence:  the functional elimination of the element of 
reliance.11  Reliance is a typical element in fraud claims, where it provides 
the necessary causal connection between the defendant’s bad act and the 
plaintiff’s injury.12  In the context of section 10(b), however, reliance has 
largely been replaced with the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.13  That doctrine 
requires that courts presume that false statements harm investors by distorting 
the market price of a security, even when particular investors did not 
personally know of, or make decisions based upon, the statement.14 
By substituting a presumption of market disruption for individualized 
proof that false statements influenced investors, courts made it far easier for 
plaintiffs to bring claims and for claims to be aggregated into class actions.15  
At the same time, the elimination of individualized reliance has made it more 
difficult to distinguish between deception, which section 10(b) prohibits, and 
poor managerial decision-making, to which section 10(b) does not speak.16  
Courts developed alternative tools to draw a distinction between the two 
types of allegations, but those tools now have the perverse effect of devaluing 
disclosures intended to facilitate shareholder participation in corporate 
governance.17 
Courts’ interpretations of section 10(b) not only draw obsolete distinctions 
between disclosure and governance, but, as this Article demonstrates, they 
 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).  
 6. See infra Part III.  
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 9. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 10. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.  
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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are often used to enforce courts’ normative views of shareholder 
preferences.18  Specifically, courts frequently assume that shareholders are 
amoral, relatively short-term stakeholders with no interests beyond the 
maximization of the stock price of the firm at issue.  But this portrait of 
shareholder preferences is factually inaccurate:  shareholders frequently 
favor a longer-term view and have interests beyond their investment in a 
particular firm.  More troublingly, it stands in opposition to the ethos of 
modern regulatory initiatives that employ shareholders as a restraining force 
on antisocial corporate conduct.19 
This Article proposes that courts adopt new interpretations of section 10(b) 
that draw more workable distinctions between governance and deception and, 
crucially, reestablish the centrality of reliance.  Though fraud on the market 
continues to have an important role, courts should distinguish between actual 
reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims in certain contexts.  Doing so 
would encourage investors to inhabit the role of corporate monitor, ultimately 
benefitting other investors and society more broadly.  Moreover, in today’s 
deregulatory climate, the issue takes on a particular urgency:  as government 
authorities retrench, the role of investors in constraining corporate behavior 
becomes especially critical.20 
At the same time, this Article recognizes that reinterpreting section 10(b) 
is only a partial fix, as the statute remains immutably focused on the 
transactional role of investors rather than the governing role.  Today’s 
investors often adopt passive strategies, purchasing and selling based on 
broad indices rather than individual company characteristics.21  These 
investors do take corporate disclosures into account, but at a different stage:  
when determining how to vote or engage with management.  To fully 
empower these investors, then, enforcement mechanisms must be tailored to 
their role in the corporate structure. 
Part I begins by describing the traditional division of labor between states 
and the federal government in the regulation of corporations.  States are 
generally responsible for delineating the substantive rights of investors 
within the corporate structure and the duties owed by managers.  Federal law 
has focused on disclosure, which is chiefly intended to allow investors to 
value securities in the context of trading.  Next, Part II establishes that the 
purposes of federal disclosure requirements have expanded to encourage 
investors—particularly institutional investors—to participate in corporate 
 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Emily Chasan, State Street Asks Boards to Disclose More on Climate Preparation, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/state-
street-asks-boards-to-disclose-more-on-climate-preparation [https://perma.cc/MKH9-
M5LW]; Andrea Vittorio, Shareholder Advocacy on Climate Change Won’t Let Up, 
Bloomberg BNA (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/shareholder-advocacy-climate-
n73014449052/ [https://perma.cc/L725-LR66] (reporting that investors will advocate for 
corporate action on climate change even if the federal government no longer prioritizes the 
issue). 
 21. Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-business-of-picking-stocks-
1476714749?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/EH59-HUZG]. 
96 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
governance, with a view toward enabling them to act as monitors of 
management behavior. 
Part III demonstrates how judicial interpretations of the private right of 
action under section 10(b) interfere with these disclosure requirements and 
devalue the role that investors occupy in the governance structure.  Then, Part 
IV shows that these interpretations are not neutral but instead inscribe into 
doctrine a particular vision of shareholder values and priorities that is at odds 
with the evolving federal regulatory scheme.  Finally, Part V proposes 
changes to harmonize judicial doctrine with the modern regulatory scheme. 
I.  FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
The relationships among corporations, their officers and directors, and 
their investors are subject to regulation at the state and federal levels.22  
Corporations are created by state law, and state law defines the substantive 
terms of their existence; federal law, at least historically, has been primarily 
concerned with ensuring that investors receive sufficient information about 
the companies in which they invest.  This Part describes the traditional 
division of regulatory labor between the states and the federal government 
and the purposes of the federal disclosure requirements. 
A.  Disclosure Versus Substance:  How States and the 
Federal Government Have Traditionally Allocated 
Responsibilities for Protecting Investors 
Corporations are generally chartered in the first instance by states, and 
state law, historically, has been responsible for regulating the legal 
requirements of the corporate form.  Thus, state law determines how power 
is allocated between stockholders and managers and delineates the matters fit 
for stockholder action, the duties owed by managers to the corporation and 
its stockholders, and the mechanisms by which stockholders can enforce their 
rights.23 
Pursuant to this authority, states have chosen to grant most management 
powers to the corporate directors, with stockholder powers kept—at least as 
a formal matter—quite minimal.24  In general, the remedy under state law for 
shareholders disenchanted with management is to sell their shares, commonly 
referred to as the “Wall Street Walk.”25  Though state law grants shareholders 
 
 22. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow:  The 
SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001); James J. Park, 
Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116 
(2017); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:  
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003). 
 23. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89–91 (1987). 
 24. In most states, there are significant barriers—if not outright prohibitions—on 
shareholders taking such actions as calling special meetings, initiating major transactions, or 
proposing director candidates. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574 (2003).  
 25. See generally Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and 
Shareholder Activism:  Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645 (2009). 
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certain rights to sue for corporate mismanagement that rises to the level of 
open self-dealing and willful illegality,26 other types of managerial decisions 
are generally treated as within management’s prerogative.27  Moreover, high 
procedural barriers to shareholder claims make them impossible to bring in 
all but the most egregious circumstances.28 
Federal law, by contrast, has not historically been concerned with the 
duties of management vis-à-vis stockholders, or with stockholder governance 
rights.  It has not regulated managerial behavior or the substantive quality of 
a particular investment.  Instead, federal law has mostly concerned itself with 
disclosure of the details of corporate operations, so that investors—and, more 
generally, the market—understand the investment’s character.29 
As a result, federal law requires public companies to make copious 
amounts of information available on a regular basis.  For example, before 
issuing new securities, a company must file a registration statement 
containing a description of the business, audited financial statements, a 
statement of the risks of the investment, the intended uses of the capital 
raised, and other similar information.30  Additionally, as long as the securities 
remain outstanding, the company must file annual reports with 
comprehensive details similar to those required in a registration statement 
and shorter quarterly reports containing updated financial information and 
management’s explanations for changes in financial results.31  And when 
certain critical events occur, the company must issue an immediate update.32 
To be sure, the distinctions between federal regulation of disclosure and 
state regulation of substance have never been clean.  Disclosure itself is a 
powerful governance mechanism, if for no other reason than that it deters 
fraud and mismanagement.33  Moreover, disclosure requirements force 
corporate managers to attend to corporate operations in order to gather 
appropriate information, thus imposing a “quasi” duty of care.34  Disclosure 
is also critical to giving shareholders a basis for exercising their state-
conferred governance rights, such as their right to vote on corporate actions.35  
 
 26. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370–71 (Del. 2006). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 130 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
 28. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism:  Disciplining 
Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 47–48 (2016); 
see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 22, at 865–66. 
 29. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 pmbl. (“An Act [t]o 
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold in interstate and foreign 
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . .”). 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2016). 
 31. Id. §§ 249.308a, 249.310. 
 32. Id. § 249.308. 
 33. AA Sommer Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. J. 263, 265 (1976) (“Very 
simply put, if every instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less 
adultery.”). 
 34. Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”:  Omnicare, Legal Risk 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 788 (2016); Thompson & Sale, 
supra note 22, at 874, 877–78; see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588, 614–16 (2003). 
 35. Park, supra note 22, at 155–56. 
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Even when used solely to value a security, disclosure still facilitates the most 
important governance right in the shareholders’ arsenal:  the right to buy and 
sell, i.e., the right of entry and exit.36  By setting market prices, investors send 
important signals to managers about the quality of their management, which 
in turn acts as a potent disciplinary mechanism.37 
Additionally, certain aspects of federal law are specifically directed toward 
stockholders’ exercise of the franchise.  When the company holds a 
shareholder vote,38 federal law requires an extensive description of the 
matters to be voted on, including directors’ qualifications, approaches to 
corporate governance, and standards for compensating executives.39  Federal 
law also contains certain requirements regarding proxy voting, including the 
requirement that shareholders be granted access to the corporate proxy for 
particular subjects.40 
That said, the hallmark of federal regulation has been its emphasis on 
disclosure to enable proper valuation, rather than as a tool to impose 
governance standards on managers.  State law has been left to attend to the 
substantive role of stockholders within the corporate structure.41  Even 
federal regulation of stockholder voting has been geared toward facilitating 
the rights conferred under state law.42  As the SEC once explained, “Although 
disclosure requirements may have some indirect effect on corporate conduct, 
the Commission may not require disclosure solely for this purpose.”43 
B.  Private Enforcement Is Oriented Toward 
Disclosure for Purposes of Valuation 
To enforce its disclosure requirements, federal law relies on the Justice 
Department, SEC, and private plaintiffs.  These entities are permitted to bring 
criminal and civil actions for disclosure violations under a patchwork of 
statutes, which require degrees of fault that range from strict liability to 
 
 36. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability:  Rethinking Corporate 
Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 516 (2000). 
 37. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 688–89 (2010).  In addition to imposing disclosure 
obligations, federal law has directly interfered in corporate governance in other ways.  For 
example, federal law has long governed proxy voting—a core aspect of governance. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26, 26 
(2003); Roe, supra note 34, at 598.  Federal law has also imposed governance standards via 
regulation of listing requirements for stock exchanges. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3, 240.10C-
1(b)(1). 
 38. Shareholder votes occur annually to elect directors and additional special votes are 
held to decide upon imperative matters. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009). 
 39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101. 
 40. Id. § 240.14a-8. 
 41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (recognizing the importance of setting appropriate 
prices for securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 pmbl. 
 42. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule:  A Failed Experiment in Merit 
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 894 (1994). 
 43. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals, Securities Act 
Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, 8 SEC Docket 33, 41, 45 (Oct. 29, 
1975). 
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willful or intentional misconduct.44  Though this ad hoc system of 
enforcement has been the frequent target of both scholarly and political ire,45 
Congress and the SEC have repeatedly stated that they rely on both public 
and private enforcement efforts to compensate investors and ensure 
compliance with the law.46  The SEC, for example, has admitted that it does 
not have the resources to police the entire securities industry.47  Instead, it 
relies on private plaintiffs to provide assistance,48 which may become even 
more necessary if—as appears possible—the SEC’s system of administrative 
adjudication is found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.49  
Thus, for the past several decades, the securities regulation architecture has 
 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 77q, 78i–j, 78r; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. See generally Samuel 
W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511 (2011). 
 45. See generally James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the 
Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012) (describing proposals to centralize 
enforcement). 
 46. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“[P]rivate lawsuits 
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and 
to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform 
their jobs.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (No. 06-484) (“Meritorious private 
actions are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement 
actions . . . .”). 
 47. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997:  Hearing on S. 1260 Before 
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th 
Cong. 41 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (“Private actions are an 
especially important supplement to the Commission’s enforcement program today because of 
the phenomenal growth of the securities industry during a time when the Commission’s staff 
and budget levels have remained relatively constant.”). 
 48. See id.; Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991:  Hearing on S. 1533 Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. of the Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 
15–16 (1992) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC) (“Because the Commission 
does not have adequate resources to detect and prosecute all violations of the federal securities 
laws, private actions perform a critical role in preserving the integrity of our securities 
markets.”); Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Outmanned and Outgunned:  Fighting on Behalf 
of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections, Address at the North American 
Securities Administrators Association Annual NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference (Apr. 16, 
2013) (“It is unrealistic to expect that state regulators or the SEC will have the resources to 
police all securities frauds or go after every fraudster.  Investors should have the ability to 
protect themselves.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as 
Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 101 (2008) (“Despite the SEC’s status as a 
highly regarded institution, both limited resources and agency capture hinder optimal 
enforcement.”); Langevoort, supra note 22, at 476 (“Enforcement personnel are spread thin 
not only among investigations and actions involving managerial accountability, but numerous 
other matters, such as the conduct of the securities industry and its associated persons.  The 
numbers are only part of the story.  SEC enforcement lawyers are underpaid, leading to high 
rates of turnover.  This high rate of turnover, in turn, means a loss of experience and expertise, 
a large burden given the resources and talent typically on the other side of an important 
enforcement matter.  The consequence is far fewer investigations and enforcement actions 
than optimal, and a pressure to settle rather than take a case through an expensive trial . . . .”). 
 49. There is currently a dispute about whether the appointment of SEC administrative 
judges (and constraints on their removal) violates Article II. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 
1168, 1183 (10th Cir. 2016).  It has been suggested that the Supreme Court may invalidate the 
current structure. See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, Gorsuch Could Tip Scales Against SEC’s 
Admin Court, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/887745/gorsuch-
could-tip-scales-against-sec-s-admin-court [https://perma.cc/28W4-P28G]. 
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been designed with the expectation that private plaintiffs will prove a 
“necessary supplement to Commission action.”50  And, in fact, some have 
endorsed the decentralized enforcement model that currently prevails:  
entrepreneurial plaintiffs may be more willing to invest in complex cases and 
expand the boundaries of the law than their public counterparts.51 
The most significant cause of action available to private investors arises 
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder.52  Section 10(b) broadly prohibits any “manipulative or 
deceptive” conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale” of a security53 
and, as relevant here, Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits false statements, or misleading 
omissions, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”54  The 
statute and rule, then, are oriented toward fraud that influences transactions, 
namely, buying and selling, and not the quality of corporate governance. 
Investors who wish to bring claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) 
must prove:  (1) the existence of a misstatement (2) that is material to 
investors (3) made intentionally or recklessly (4) on which investors relied 
(5) that caused economic losses and (6) caused damages.55  In recognition of 
the distinct spheres of federal and state corporate regulation, the Supreme 
Court held in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green56 that section 10(b) does not 
extend to claims based solely on violations of fiduciary duty, such as 
negligent, reckless, or disloyal behavior; instead, such matters are regulated 
by state law.57  Thus, in keeping with the federal emphasis on disclosure and 
valuation, section 10(b) is only available for claims based on deceptive 
conduct.  By now, it has become something of a cliché for courts to declare 
that section 10(b) is unavailable merely to challenge mismanagement.58 
That section 10(b) is not in the first instance designed to address 
governance deficiencies is hardly a surprise; indeed, one of the earliest 
Supreme Court cases on the subject, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores,59 limited private section 10(b) claims to plaintiffs who either bought 
or sold a security, rather than to plaintiffs who merely held a security.60  Blue 
Chip was not intended to thwart governance claims so much as frivolous 
 
 50. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (quoting J.I. 
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
 51. See Park, supra note 22, at 127–28, 160; see also Burch, supra note 48, at 75, 81–82. 
 52. There are a few other significant causes of action available to investors for false 
corporate statements, but all are limited in particular ways.  For example, Rule 14a-9 is 
applicable only to false proxies and has very tight causation requirements for plaintiffs seeking 
damages. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.  Section 11 only applies when a 
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initial public offering. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace:  Sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (2000). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 55. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 57. Id. at 474. 
 58. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 537 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 59. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 60. Id. at 754–55. 
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ones,61 but it orients section 10(b) toward investors in their capacity as 
consumers of a corporate product—corporate securities—rather than as 
participants in the enterprise.62 
The remaining elements of a section 10(b) cause of action continue in this 
vein, focusing on the process of price setting.  Materiality is defined in terms 
of information that “would have . . . significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information” for the purpose of investment decisions.63  Damages are usually 
defined to mean the difference between the price investors paid for the 
security and its true value at the time of purchase.64  All of these elements, 
then, treat disclosures as relevant solely for the purpose of allowing investors 
to value a security when directly engaged in buying or selling.  Even the 
reliance element of section 10(b) has largely been transformed into an inquiry 
into proper valuation, via courts’ adoption of the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine. 
Decades ago, courts recognized that section 10(b) claims based on open 
market frauds—public statements that influence the price of securities in 
organized markets—are uniquely difficult to bring.  They are extremely 
expensive to litigate relative to the size of most investments, and establishing 
reliance on false information in this context presents special challenges.  
Most investors rely on a variety of information sources, including statements 
issued directly by the corporation as well as recommendations from analysts 
and associates (who themselves may have relied on corporate-issued 
information), news stories, and other types of data.  Indexed investors may 
not rely on corporate-specific information at all.65 
In response, courts developed the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which 
eliminates the need to examine reliance on an investor-by-investor basis.66  
The doctrine affords plaintiffs in a section 10(b) action the benefit of two 
presumptions:  first, that any material information—including false 
information—introduced into an “open and developed market” influences 
stock prices,67 and second, that investors who transact in such a market “rely” 
on stock prices when they purchase at the market price.68  Together, the two 
presumptions become a syllogism:  investors who rely on prices that have 
been distorted by fraud have, indirectly, relied on the fraud itself.69 
 
 61. Id. at 739. 
 62. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?  Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful 
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1741–44 (2012). 
 63. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 64. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 682 n.30 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 65. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic:  Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 895, 916 (2013).  
 66. See generally Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); 
Basic, 485 U.S. 224. 
 67. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 68. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2411. 
 69. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42. 
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The doctrine thus kills two birds with one stone.  First, it eases the burden 
on plaintiffs attempting to prove reliance.70  Second, because reliance is 
decided based on market characteristics rather than investor characteristics, 
it facilitates the use of the class actions, which mitigates the expenses 
associated with individual claims.71  Today, most section 10(b) claims 
involving open-market fraud are brought using the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine.72  Thus, the element of reliance is no longer an inquiry into the 
actual preferences of defrauded investors but is instead an inquiry into the 
market-wide impact of corporate statements on the pricing of securities. 
The existence of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine represents a trade-off 
between the goals of compensation and deterrence.  The two are somewhat 
at odds:  deterrence is best achieved via the high damages available through 
collective action, but the risks and coordination problems inherent in such 
actions encourage settlements that result in little investor compensation.73  To 
achieve truly compensatory damages, then, shareholders must file individual 
lawsuits that have little deterrent effect; meanwhile, the complexity and 
expenses of such actions make them difficult to pursue in the first place.  In 
light of these trade-offs, our legal system has largely favored deterrence with 
almost all actions proceeding on a class basis.74  As a result, questions 
regarding the proper interpretation of section 10(b) similarly tend to arise in 
the class action context. 
In recent years, however, the purposes of federal mandatory disclosure 
have changed.  These changes have placed increasing pressures on an 
enforcement regime that was designed for a different era. 
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 73. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 28, at 65. 
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(quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446–47 (N.Y. 1931))).  Finally, states 
tend to take their cues from federal law when crafting their own investor protections.  
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Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985).  State common law may borrow 
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Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Basis Pac-Rim 
Opportunity Fund (Master) v. TCW Asset Mgmt. Co., 48 N.Y.S.3d 654, 656 (App. Div. 2017). 
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II.  DISCLOSURE’S EVOLUTION:  
FROM VALUATION TO GOVERNANCE 
Despite shareholders’ limited powers under state law, federal law has 
gradually increased shareholders’ ability to influence corporate behavior and 
encouraged shareholders to flex their newly invigorated muscles. 
Federal disclosure standards have long been geared toward informing 
investors of the character of the security—which in more modern terms refers 
to facilitating price accuracy—with the additional goal of detecting and 
preventing fraud and embezzlement.75  For many years, critics of the dual 
regime for regulating corporations insisted that managers have too much 
power vis-à-vis shareholders and use this power to extract economic rents to 
the shareholders’ detriment.76  Some argued that increasing shareholder 
power will cause management to be more responsive to shareholder desires, 
which ultimately will result in more loyal managers and better-run, more 
profitable companies.77  Federal law has responded to this criticism by 
developing new rules aimed at enhancing shareholder power within the 
corporate structure. 
These initiatives take a two-pronged approach.  First, federal law has 
directly expanded shareholder governance powers in publicly traded 
companies.  Though buying and selling necessarily remains one of the most 
powerful weapons in the shareholder arsenal, the SEC has also taken steps to 
increase shareholder power by deregulating communications among 
shareholders regarding proxy voting,78 imposing limitations on the authority 
of brokers to vote stock in the absence of shareholder instructions,79 requiring 
that corporations “unbundle” proposals to allow for separate shareholder 
votes,80 and loosening restrictions on shareholders’ ability to use corporate 
proxies to affect director elections.81  Federal law has also required 
nonbinding “say on pay” votes requiring shareholder approval of executive 
pay packages.82  These measures have greatly enhanced shareholders’ ability 
to influence corporate behavior. 
 
 75. See supra Part I.B; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities 
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 80. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2016). 
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2010). 
 82. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010).   
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Second, shareholders’ new governance powers are complemented by 
expanded federal disclosure requirements.  These disclosures are intended 
less to assist with the proper valuation of securities than to encourage 
investors to police the quality of corporate decision-making.83  For example, 
one of the most controversial aspects of corporate governance concerns 
executive compensation, and volumes have been written weighing in on 
optimal compensation designs.84  Though the responsibility for designing 
pay packages rests with corporate directors, the SEC has gradually expanded 
disclosure requirements pertaining to executive compensation, with pages of 
instruction dedicated to “providing specific categories of compensation and 
exact formulations for the charts in which management must present the 
information.”85  The SEC thus openly encourages investors to evaluate 
directors’ decision-making processes and, if necessary, apply pressure to 
alter them. 
The global financial crisis heightened concerns that corporate 
compensation was poorly calibrated to align managerial incentives with 
shareholder desires.  Commentators argued that compensation structures 
were designed to reward short-term risk-taking at the expense of the long-
term health of the enterprise.86  In response, federal statutes and regulations 
imposed new requirements that companies disclose the relationship between 
compensation policies and corporate risk-taking87 and the relationship 
between compensation and corporate performance,88 and identify the ratio 
between the compensation of the CEO and the compensation of the median 
employee.89  Once again, these disclosures are facially not intended to assist 
with valuation, but rather aim to provide specific information that 
shareholders can use as a lever to influence corporate behavior.90  As Hillary 
Sale describes it, “The regulations have been growing steadily and are not 
solely about disclosure.  Instead, the regulations are about the power of 
disclosure to force substance.”91 
 
 83. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 65 (2007); Mariana 
Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 389 (2016); Park, 
supra note 22, at 136 (“[D]isclosure is increasingly used as a method for influencing corporate 
affairs.”). 
 84. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 76; David Walker, The Law and 
Economics of Executive Compensation:  Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 232 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); 
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of 
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (1999). 
 85. Thompson & Sale, supra note 22, at 875 (footnote omitted). 
 86. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 247, 249 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:  Why 
Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
1019, 1047 (2012).  
 87. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,335 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(1) (2012). 
 89. Id. § 78l. 
 90. See Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 
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Federal law also contains a host of other disclosure requirements that give 
shareholders insight into the processes by which decisions are made, and thus 
a foothold into influencing those processes.  For example, public corporations 
must disclose costs associated with environmental compliance,92 board 
diversity and independence,93 managerial oversight of internal information 
flow,94 their reasons for not separating the chairperson and CEO roles,95 and 
any codes of ethics governing corporate managers, including waivers of those 
codes.96  The SEC also requires companies to disclose how often the board 
of directors meets and identify any directors who attend fewer than 75 percent 
of those meetings.97  By requiring that this information be disclosed, federal 
law not only gives investors a window into corporate operations, which they 
may use when they exercise their governance powers, but also makes 
particular issues more salient, thus encouraging greater shareholder attention.  
When combined with the long-standing requirements that corporations 
disclose any known trends that could impact operations98 and the risks 
associated with their securities (including legal risks),99 the collective weight 
of required federal disclosures becomes a significant starting point for 
shareholder engagement. 
To be sure, there have been signals that the current Congress may rollback 
some of the recent changes to the federal scheme.100  As of this writing, 
however, the regulatory framework remains intact, and therefore represents 
the current direction of federal policy. 
Moreover, this new regime has not ended with federally imposed 
disclosure requirements.  The more power shareholders gain, the more 
information they themselves demand from their companies, further 
enhancing their ability to participate in governance.  Thus, shareholders have 
forced corporations to disclose more information about political spending,101 
sustainability,102 and similar issues.103  Investors have particularly 
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encouraged corporations to make greater disclosures about—and devote 
greater attention to—risks associated with climate change.104  Collectively, 
these types of disclosures are known as “Environmental, Social, 
Governance” (ESG) disclosures.  Evidence suggests that investors 
increasingly seek out investment opportunities based on companies’ ESG 
disclosures,105 and companies in turn encourage investors to evaluate their 
performance along these dimensions.106 
In sum, federal law has undergone a significant shift.  Even as newer 
regulations take the form of disclosure requirements, they are transparently 
designed to grant shareholders a greater voice in the conduct of corporate 
operations.  That power has snowballed, allowing shareholders to claim even 
more voice via disclosure. 
Critical to these efforts has been the rise of the institutional shareholder.107  
It has long been recognized that dispersed, rationally passive retail 
stockholders cannot be expected to exert serious pressure on management.  
These shareholders suffer from difficult collective action problems and lack 
both the expertise and the incentives to educate themselves on corporate 
governance issues.108  In recent decades, however, stock ownership has 
become concentrated among a relatively small group of large institutional 
investors.109  For these investors, merely selling their stock to express 
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disapproval of management is not always an option.110  Holdings may be so 
large that divestment would drive prices down, causing the shareholder to 
incur substantial losses.111  Indexed investors cannot sell at all in response to 
bad management.112  Thus, in many instances, direct policing of corporate 
management has become a preferable alternative, or at least a supplement, to 
the Wall Street Walk.  The large stakes held or controlled by these institutions 
strengthen both their incentives to monitor corporate management and their 
leverage when doing so.113  Monitoring costs have also been reduced by 
proxy advisory services, like Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass 
Lewis, which provide recommendations to institutions as to how to vote their 
shares.114 
The new federal initiatives take advantage of these developments, and the 
expanded disclosures and governance powers granted to shareholders assume 
an audience of investors capable of assimilating and making use of the new 
information.  Federal law has even encouraged greater institutional 
participation in governance by articulating fiduciary duties of institutional 
investors to vote their shares and requiring disclosure of mutual fund 
votes.115 
The experiment has panned out:  institutional shareholders have become 
much more likely to engage directly with management and advocate for 
changes in governance.116  They may sponsor shareholder proposals 
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designed to prompt management to adopt various reforms or support 
dissident candidates for director slots.  On a more basic level, though, 
institutions have begun addressing management through “soft” forms of 
engagement—discussions, counseling sessions, and negotiation—none of 
which necessarily ends in divestiture or a proxy contest.117  When matters are 
addressed through shareholder votes, the proposals are typically precatory; 
they operate as suggestions to management, rather than commands.  Even 
when they fail, significant minority support can prompt management to adopt 
voluntary reform.118  Under pressure from shareholders, many companies 
have adopted new standards that directors be elected with a majority—rather 
than the traditional plurality—of shareholder votes, but these standards are 
likewise often nonbinding; they represent a form of communication rather 
than direct control.119  The SEC has strongly encouraged these types of 
dialogues between institutional investors and corporate boards.120 
The difficulty with disclosure as a governance mechanism, however, is that 
the federal enforcement apparatus continues to view the matter solely through 
the lens of valuation.  As the substance-disclosure line is eroded and the role 
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of the shareholder is placed in flux, section 10(b) doctrine has become 
increasingly out of step with federal policy and, worse, actively undermines 
it by denying shareholders the role in the corporate governance structure that 
federal law is attempting to encourage.  The danger is particularly acute due 
to the federal system’s reliance on private enforcement as a mechanism for 
enforcement and deterrence.121 
III.  JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
NEW DISCLOSURE REGIME 
The shift in the purposes of federal disclosure presents new challenges to 
enforcement.  Section 10(b), with its emphasis on disclosure for purposes of 
valuation, is not crafted to address disclosure violations whose most 
immediate effect is to diminish shareholders’ ability to discipline corporate 
managers.  It still could play that role, however, if not for overly cramped 
judicial interpretations of the statute that were designed for an earlier era. 
A.  Federal Law Contains No Cause of Action 
Designed to Enforce 
Governance-Related Disclosures 
The federal trend toward requiring companies to open their governance 
processes to shareholder participation is relatively new; as a result, there 
exists no private cause of action specifically designed to allow shareholders 
to enforce their rights.  The closest thing to a “governance” claim under 
federal law arises under Rule 14a-9, promulgated under section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act.122  That rule prohibits false statements in corporate proxy 
materials and thus explicitly recognizes deception in a manner that injures 
shareholders’ governance rights as an actionable harm.123  However, Rule 
14a-9 does not address corporate statements made outside the proxy context 
that may influence voting decisions, nor does it acknowledge or protect any 
of the other forms of shareholder engagement, beyond simply casting a vote, 
that have come to dominate the landscape. 
Additionally, at least when it comes to damages claims, Rule 14a-9 has 
been interpreted to require very tight causation requirements between the 
vote and the injury alleged by stockholders.  Under these standards, plaintiffs 
must show that a shareholder vote was necessary to complete the particular 
challenged transaction.124  It is not sufficient, for example, to show that 
shareholders were misled into supporting a director who then made poor 
governance choices.125  As a result, Rule 14a-9 may not permit claims 
associated with precatory votes, or votes that—while failing to win a 
majority—still gain the support of an influential minority, both of which are 
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key mechanisms for shareholder participation today.  Thus, Rule 14a-9 has 
limited utility for protecting shareholders’ ability to participate in corporate 
decision-making, leaving section 10(b) to fill the vacuum. 
B.  Section 10(b) as an Alternative Option 
Though not structured with this aim in mind, section 10(b) can be used to 
enhance shareholder participation rights by punishing false or misleading 
statements relating to corporate governance mechanisms.  When a 
corporation misleads investors on a subject regarding its internal processes—
for example, by falsely claiming to have adopted compliance policies or risk 
mitigation strategies—that statement is actionable under section 10(b).  As 
one court put it, “[T]he mere fact that the conduct in question arguably 
constitutes mismanagement will not preclude a claim under the federal 
securities laws if the defendant made a statement of material fact wholly 
inconsistent with known existing mismanagement.”126  The threat of 
damages for such statements can deter corporations from issuing false 
statements in the first place.  Once full disclosure has been made—for 
example, the admission of flawed risk management—shareholders are now 
in a position to pressure the company to correct its policies.  Indeed, many 
scholars have championed section 10(b) as a deterrent mechanism to ensure 
the quality of corporate governance.127 
The chief obstacle to utilizing section 10(b) in this manner, however, is 
judicial resistance.  As described above, section 10(b) claims must be rooted 
in deceptive conduct—a mere failure to govern properly is not sufficient.128  
However, the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which functionally eliminates 
the element of reliance, threatens to make any kind of undisclosed problem 
actionable under section 10(b).  This leaves courts unable to distinguish cases 
involving true deception of investors from attacks on the quality of 
governance itself. 
Typically, a fraud-on-the-market claim begins when bad news is released 
about a public company.  The news might explicitly admit that prior 
statements were false—such as a restatement of previously released financial 
results—but more commonly, it represents a negative legal or business 
development, such as a drop in sales, a product defect, or a regulatory 
investigation.  The job of the plaintiffs’ attorney is then to identify statements 
upon which investors may plausibly have relied and that are arguably 
rendered false by the newly disclosed problems.  The plaintiff-investor does 
not even need to have relied on particular statements, as would be required 
for an ordinary fraud claim, because whether one investor did or did not 
personally rely on a statement is not the issue.  The issue is whether the 
market as a whole was fooled.  Indeed, no single investor is, or should be, 
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capable of identifying all of the statements that may have influenced the 
market.129  Courts entertaining fraud-on-the-market claims have gone so far 
as to exclude evidence as to whether particular investors relied on particular 
statements, recognizing that any single investor’s experience is beside the 
point.130 
Given the extensive disclosure requirements imposed on public 
corporations, many of which directly concern the quality of governance, risk 
management systems, and business trends, it is likely that if there was an 
undisclosed problem known to the company at the time (as required by 
section 10(b)’s scienter element),131 plaintiffs’ attorneys would be able to 
identify some public statement that was arguably false at the time it was 
issued.132  And because fraud-on-the-market does not require investors to 
prove that they relied on the statement, there is a chance that there will always 
be a potential section 10(b) claim based on any unfavorable information that 
was known to management and kept secret for any length of time.  As a result, 
it is the substantive conduct, rather than the ostensibly false statement, that 
becomes the center of gravity for many section 10(b) claims.133 
To be sure, from a normative perspective, this is not necessarily a bad 
thing.  The federal securities laws contain extensive disclosure requirements 
precisely to prevent companies from concealing problems from the market 
for prolonged periods.  One might reasonably argue, then, that such 
concealment should be actionable.  To do so, however, is to elide the 
distinction between governance and disclosure that has historically 
characterized the separate spheres of federal and state law.134 
Courts addressing section 10(b) claims are thus tasked with discriminating 
between disclosure claims and governance claims without reference to the 
most obvious distinguishing factor:  the presence of a deceived investor.  
Instead, they have crafted a series of alternative inquiries that cabin section 
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10(b)’s scope.135  But these inquiries undermine efforts to use disclosure to 
empower shareholders as corporate constituents.136 
1.  Puffery 
Puffery is a concept that exists in multiple areas of law and creates a legal 
immunity for vague, overly optimistic, or hyperbolic statements.137  The 
intuition behind the doctrine is that salespersons can be expected to hype their 
wares with overclaims—“world’s best coffee!”—and it would be 
unreasonable for purchasers to rely on such statements when transacting. 
Puffery is vigorously employed by courts to dismiss claims under section 
10(b).138  It is typically defined as a species of immaterial statement that is 
so vague, optimistic, self-congratulatory, or boilerplate that investors are 
presumed to simply disregard it.139  The puffery doctrine is a mechanism that 
courts can use to screen out claims that are, or appear to be, rooted in 
objections to management’s conduct, rather than based on deceptive 
behavior.  Per Santa Fe, absent a false statement, there has been no fraud, 
and thus no claim under section 10(b).140  Puffing statements are not 
“statements” for section 10(b) purposes141; take them away, and all that’s left 
is a complaint about management’s substantive governance choices. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that courts frequently dismiss on puffery grounds 
claims that facially appear to be failed products of the litigation process 
described above:  namely, bad news was announced, attorneys searched for 
false statements, and, frequently in the absence of anything more concrete, 
seized upon banal, vaguely optimistic representations.  For example, in 
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,142 after a company experienced business 
failures, the plaintiffs filed a section 10(b) action attacking such statements 
as “the second quarter was a period of significant accomplishment . . . [o]ur 
fundamentals are strong,” and that the company had “growth opportunities” 
due to funding raised in its IPO.143  In IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension 
Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC,144 a 
section 10(b) lawsuit was filed when an ultimately unsuccessful merger was 
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described as “off to a promising start.”145  When a cruise company revealed 
sagging bookings, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that earlier representations 
of “encouraging” prospects were fraudulent.146  In one case, the plaintiffs 
openly alleged that the company failed to disclose a “change in business 
philosophy” that threatened its financial results, resulting in a dismissal on 
the ground that the prior business philosophy had been disclosed only in 
puffing terms.147  Similar examples abound.148  For these cases in particular, 
the plaintiffs’ chief complaint appears to be fundamentally rooted in 
objections to management performance with deception tacked on as a legal 
hook to shoehorn the claim into section 10(b). 
The puffery doctrine has been heavily criticized by commentators, partly 
for the notorious inconsistency with which it is applied,149 and partly for 
representing a kind of armchair market psychology.  Courts purport to 
identify what information investors “truly” value, but there is extensive 
evidence that these assumptions are not correct.150  Without disputing the 
validity of these criticisms, it is better to recognize that the doctrine is 
frequently not used as a mechanism for identifying statements that investors 
do, or do not, “actually” rely upon.  Indeed, faced with evidence of actual 
reliance, courts have still rejected some claims on puffery grounds.151 
Instead, the doctrine represents a rejection of at least some attempts to use 
section 10(b) to police the quality of management.  As one court put it, 
“[i]nvestment gains and losses are risks inherent in a capitalist system, and 
these risks are tacitly accepted when any group or individual chooses to 
invest,”152 and therefore puffing statements do not “necessitate disclosure of 
every event that occurred in the course of [a corporation’s] daily 
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operations.”153  For this reason, it is hardly surprising that puffery, once 
declared to have “all but gone the way of the dodo,” enjoyed a reemergence 
just a few years after the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine.154 
The trouble with courts’ ad hoc judgment regarding what “counts” as a 
governance claim relative to a disclosure claim is that claims based on ESG 
statements, such as ethics codes and risk mitigation strategies, are particularly 
attractive targets for dismissal on puffery grounds.155  In fact, it is common 
for plaintiffs to bring section 10(b) claims based on undisclosed regulatory 
violations or other morally questionable behavior, pinned to such allegedly 
false statements as “[the company] set the standard for best practices in risk 
management techniques”156 or maintained a “culture of high ethical 
standards.”157  At the same time, courts adhere to the principle that “general 
statements about reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms are 
inactionable ‘puffery,’ meaning that they are ‘too general to cause a 
reasonable investor to rely upon them.’”158  Courts’ rejections of these 
claims—to the point of holding that even federally required disclosures are 
“puffery”159—represent a rejection of federal attempts to enlist shareholders 
in the governance project. 
One of the more overt holdings on the subject came from the Southern 
District of New York in a case against Barclays.  The court noted: 
Plaintiffs . . . argu[e], with respect to statements about legal compliance, 
that “when Barclays was telling the public that its ‘business may not be 
conducted in accordance with applicable laws around the world’ Barclays 
was, at that time, actively violating laws around the world by manipulating 
LIBOR.”  If this were sufficient, then every individual who purchased the 
stock of a company that was later discovered to have broken any law could 
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theoretically sue for fraud.  This is precisely what the Second Circuit sought 
to avoid [in its puffery rulings].160 
In other words, it is puffery to proclaim compliance with the law precisely 
because any other holding would force the company to remain true to that 
representation.161 
In Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.,162 another court 
explicitly wielded the puffery doctrine to prevent disclosure regulations from 
influencing substance.  There, the court held that ethical codes are puffery 
because federal law requires that they be disclosed.163  As the court put it, 
“[a] company’s essentially mandatory adoption of a code of ethics simply 
does not imply that all of its directors and officers are following that code of 
ethics.”164   In fact, “the mandatory nature of the adoption of such a code 
makes clear that all public companies—whether run by crooks or angels—
will adopt just such a code.”165 
The articulated rationale for many puffery holdings—that the statements 
are too similar to those offered by other companies to carry much weight in 
the minds of investors166—is not only unpersuasive, but is something of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  Corporations frequently make disclosures similar to 
those of other companies, from representations that their financial statements 
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles167 to declarations 
that a merger price is “fair” to shareholders,168 and yet none of these 
statements are declared to be puffery on grounds of ubiquity.  Moreover, in 
a world where computer programs analyze corporate SEC filings so as to 
instantly trade on even minute data changes,169 if a corporation did not, for 
example, proclaim itself to exhibit “financial discipline” when all of its 
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competitors did,170 investors would likely take the absence seriously.171  As 
a result, when courts treat all such statements as equally meaningless, they 
provide no incentive for corporations to refrain from making them when they 
are no longer truthful.172  The further effect is to raise costs for corporations 
desiring to single themselves out to shareholders by attesting to their 
discipline.173  In other words, courts undermine the use of disclosure as a 
mechanism to invite shareholders to participate in the governance project. 
2.  Loss Causation and Damages 
Under section 10(b), a plaintiff must prove the element of “loss causation,” 
namely, that the plaintiff experienced an economic loss due to the fraud.  The 
precise amount of the loss—the plaintiff’s damages—must be established as 
well.174  For both measures, courts assume that securities have a “true value” 
that represents the price at which they would have traded if investors were 
aware of all relevant facts.  This “true value” is distinguished from securities’ 
“inflated value,” meaning the price at which the securities traded as a result 
of the lie.  Cognizable losses and damages under section 10(b) are generally 
defined as the difference between the two.175 
These definitions are predicated on a conception of securities as static 
objects, worth a certain amount that is or is not distorted by a particular 
falsehood.  But securities are not static.  If someone represents that a glass 
ring is a diamond, the amount of the damage caused is readily ascertainable 
because the quality of the object remains the same.176  By contrast, if 
shareholders are granted a real role in governance, disclosure changes the 
quality of the security.  Admissions that internal controls are poor, for 
example, almost certainly ensure that management will invest in corrective 
measures, and confessions that a business initiative has a low probability of 
success are likely to cause investors to use all of the tools at their disposal—
selling, voting, and engagement—to insist that the initiative be suspended.  
And if a company fails to attest that it has quality controls or risk management 
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systems when all of its competitors do, investors are almost certain to demand 
reforms.  Current conceptions of loss causation and damages fail to recognize 
shareholders’ contributions to corporate value and thereby further impede the 
use of section 10(b) to enforce disclosure standards intended to empower 
shareholders as participants in governance. 
In the context of publicly traded securities, establishing that losses were 
caused by fraud is a uniquely complex problem.  These securities have 
established market prices, and, even if that price is too high (because it is 
inflated by fraud) any investor who purchases at that price has not 
experienced an economic loss until the price drops.177  In Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,178 the Supreme Court held that a price drop, 
without more, is not sufficient to establish the element of loss causation; 
instead, the drop must be caused by the removal of the original artificial 
inflation.179  Drops caused by intervening events, such as an unrelated 
economic disruption, have not been caused by the fraud and cannot form the 
basis of a section 10(b) claim.180  So long as the market remains fooled, the 
investor has not been harmed specifically by the fraud itself. 
The difficulty with this standard is that there is great uncertainty as to what 
it means for a loss to be “caused” by artificial inflation leaving the stock.181  
Currently, there are two approaches, although the application of the rules can 
vary widely.  Some courts have defined loss causation very narrowly, holding 
that the element is satisfied only if there is a price drop in response to a 
“corrective disclosure”—meaning that the specific statement that misled the 
market must be shown to have been false and the market must adjust to 
account for the correction.182  Other courts find that the element is satisfied 
if losses represent the “materialization of the risk” that the fraud itself 
concealed, even if the market is not at that time made aware of an earlier 
lie.183  For example, a company may suddenly announce a liquidity crisis, 
causing a stock price drop, without disclosing that the crisis was the natural 
culmination of prior fraudulent financial statements.184  While there may not 
be any loss causation under the corrective disclosure standard, loss causation 
exists under the materialization of risk standard because the crisis is the result 
of a concealed risk—financial failure—that materialized. 
Conceptually, losses that result from materialization of the risk go beyond 
the difference between the purchase price at the time of the original lie and 
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the security’s true value at that time.  In most cases, these losses represent a 
worsening of the original problem.  For example, suppose a company has a 
pending new drug application with the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).  The probability of a denial is 80 percent, but the company tells 
investors that the probability is 10 percent.  The stock price is artificially 
inflated.  When the FDA denies the application, the risk has materialized, but 
now the probability of a denial is 100 percent.  The FDA’s action will 
therefore cause the stock price to fall further than it would have had the 
company told the truth in the first place.185 
These kinds of losses are, in a sense, governance losses—they are not 
merely the result of the original artificial inflation leaving the stock, but are 
also the consequence of managers’ substantive choices in running the 
company.  Some losses may simply represent the worsening of a problem 
management sought to conceal, as in the FDA example, and some may even 
represent an aggravation of the problem caused by the cover-up, such as when 
a company makes ill-advised business moves in an effort to disguise an 
earlier accounting fraud.186  Either way, they do not represent the impact of 
the lie alone; they additionally represent the damage to the company wrought 
by managerial decision-making. 
The corrective disclosure standard has several problems, including that it 
misapprehends how information affects stock prices.  A lie is a piece of 
information that investors use to value the stock.  If newer, more accurate 
information later comes to light via materialization of the risk concealed by 
the lie (such as the FDA’s denial of the drug application), the lie itself 
becomes irrelevant and its effects dissipate while investors update their 
information.187  Requiring an explicit corrective disclosure makes little 
economic sense and, worse, allows corporations to evade liability by 
strategically timing their communications.188 
But the corrective disclosure standard is striking for a second reason:  it 
represents a refusal to recognize interference with shareholders’ governance 
rights as a cognizable section 10(b) harm.  The theory behind ESG 
disclosures is that dysfunctional behavior will not persist because shareholder 
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pressure will force a correction.  When corporations issue false information, 
they deny shareholders this opportunity, allowing managerial mistakes to 
snowball and inflict further damage on the company.  And when courts refuse 
to recognize these losses, there is no value placed on shareholders’ ability to 
influence corporate policy. 
This orientation is rendered even more stark by the standard definition of 
section 10(b) damages.  Most courts hold that section 10(b) usually permits 
only “out-of-pocket” damages, defined as the difference between the price 
paid for the security and its true value at the time of purchase.189  Any further 
decrease in value that occurs after the purchase is not recoverable.190  To 
ascertain the value that the security would have commanded at the outset, 
plaintiffs typically look to the price of the security when the truth is disclosed 
and the artificial inflation has been removed, and work from a baseline 
assumption that this price represents the stock’s true value.191  They then 
calculate backward to determine the amount of artificial inflation that had 
been in the stock at various points in time since the fraud began.192 
Plaintiffs additionally have the burden of segmenting out intervening 
events that may also have pulled down the price of the stock.193  These 
intervening events might be entirely unrelated phenomena, but they might 
also represent materializations of the original risk if the risk grew larger over 
time.  For example, in In re Vivendi, S.A. Securities Litigation,194 concealed 
liquidity problems worsened over the course of a long class period, and 
investors who bought at earlier points, when the situation was not as dire, 
were not entitled to damages resulting from the company’s subsequent 
decline in fortunes.195  Because many cases are like Vivendi in that the 
problem worsens before the fraud becomes known and the artificial inflation 
is eliminated from the stock,196 the standard damages measure does not allow 
investors to recover for poor governance concealed and enabled by the fraud.  
Indeed, some theorists have argued that because any stock price decline 
associated with a disclosure of the fraud also represents losses due to 
shareholders’ new doubts in management’s abilities, these too should be 
segmented out and treated as unrecoverable.197 
This issue was on sharp display recently in Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C.198  The 
plaintiffs alleged that BP falsely described the adequacy of its safety 
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protocols.199  The truth was not revealed, however, until Deepwater Horizon 
exploded, sending thousands of barrels of oil gushing into the Gulf of Mexico 
every day for months on end.200  Naturally, the disaster sent BP’s stock price 
tumbling, far beyond the amount of artificial inflation that had been 
introduced into the stock as a result of the lie.201  Or, to put it another way, 
had BP confessed to the abysmal state of its safety systems at the outset, its 
stock price surely would have dropped but not to the dramatic degree that 
occurred once the risk created by the deficient safety protocols 
materialized.202 
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could only collect damages that 
represented the amount they overpaid for the stock, namely, the portion of 
the drop attributable solely to the misstatements.203  According to the court, 
any damages due to materialization of risk, management’s poor governance, 
or new doubts about management’s abilities, were not part of the fraud itself 
because they did not represent the inflated purchase price that resulted from 
the lie, and therefore were not recoverable under section 10(b).204  
Governance damages, the court presumed, were more properly the subject of 
a state law claim for fiduciary breach.205 
This reasoning, of course, assumed that had the truth been disclosed, the 
stock would have been repriced to account for the newly increased risk of a 
disaster.  Investors who bought at the new, lower price would be deemed to 
have accepted all of BP’s reported profits and benefits at that time.206  Yet 
this counterfactual was never a possibility because BP could not have simply 
confessed to the truth and remained at the status quo.  Had BP admitted the 
deficiencies in its safety protocols, investors—not to mention regulators—
would have demanded their correction, thus rapidly diminishing (if not 
eliminating) the likelihood of a disaster of that magnitude.  Disclosure would 
have functioned to correct the underlying substantive problem.207  Thus, the 
fraud did not simply conceal a risk that would have been factored into the 
price had it been disclosed:  it denied shareholders the opportunity to improve 
the risk profile of the company.  But these damages are entirely unrecognized 
by the out-of-pocket damages measure.208 
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The out-of-pocket damages rule places an additional burden on ESG-
related claims because soft information, such as risk disclosures and 
sustainability reports, is the hardest to value ex ante, and thus the most 
difficult to separate from intervening causes ex post.  In BP, shareholders 
were unable to model the value of the safety misstatements standing alone, 
causing the court to dismiss their claims.209  Thus, the standard both 
substantively and procedurally devalues ESG disclosures.210 
Courts’ tendency to discount governance-related disclosures is particularly 
notable in cases like Meyer v. Greene.211  In Greene, the company 
experienced a significant stock price drop after the announcement of an SEC 
investigation into the defendant’s accounting practices.212  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the announcement represented a corrective disclosure.213  The 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 
the commencement of an SEC investigation, without more, is insufficient 
to constitute a corrective disclosure for purposes of § 10(b).  The 
announcement of an investigation reveals just that—an investigation—and 
nothing more.  To be sure, stock prices may fall upon the announcement of 
an SEC investigation, but that is because the investigation can be seen to 
portend an added risk of future corrective action.  That does not mean that 
the investigations, in and of themselves, reveal to the market that a 
company’s previous statements were false or fraudulent.214 
Similarly, in Loos v. Immersion Corp.,215 the Ninth Circuit held: 
The announcement of an investigation does not “reveal” fraudulent 
practices to the market.  Indeed, at the moment an investigation is 
announced, the market cannot possibly know what the investigation will 
ultimately reveal.  While the disclosure of an investigation is certainly an 
ominous event, it simply puts investors on notice of a potential future 
disclosure of fraudulent conduct.  Consequently, any decline in a 
corporation’s share price following the announcement of an investigation 
can only be attributed to market speculation about whether fraud has 
occurred.  This type of speculation cannot form the basis of a viable loss 
causation theory.216 
The court’s language is telling:  changes to the risk profile of a security 
due to uncertainty about management misconduct is not a cognizable loss for 
section 10(b) purposes.  Clearly, other types of changes to a stock’s risk 
profile, such as an increased risk of an environmental disaster, have value, 
but when the change in risk is specifically due to concerns about management 
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truthfulness and quality, courts refuse to recognize a loss, at least so long as 
the investigation does not result in a finding of wrongdoing.217  Such holdings 
legally mandate that shareholders not place any value on the increased risk 
of problematic governance, thus implicitly denying shareholders a 
governance role and contradicting explicit congressional policy.  Indeed, the 
very purpose of certain mandated disclosures, such as certifications requiring 
a corporation’s chief executive officer to attest to the adequacy of internal 
controls and the accuracy of corporate disclosures,218 is to bolster investor 
confidence in corporate governance quality, which is then expected to assist 
with market valuation.219  When courts disparage the importance of investor 
confidence, they impede the achievement of these federal goals. 
Once again, many of these problems can be attributed to the functional 
elimination of the reliance requirement.  BP is once again instructive.  There, 
the Fifth Circuit held that its measure of cognizable damages—the decrease 
in the stock’s price attributable solely to the dissipation of artificial inflation, 
without consideration of damages due to mismanagement—could be 
confined solely to cases brought under a fraud-on-the-market theory.220  If an 
investor actually relied on the misstatements, the investor could recover the 
damages resulting from the materialization of the risk.221  The court’s 
reasoning was that the market price represents an average judgment of the 
value of the stock given various risks, but some investors may have different 
risk tolerances than the market as a whole.222  Whereas the rest of the market 
might be willing to assign a particular ex ante numeric value to the risk of a 
disastrous explosion—one that was distorted to some degree by BP’s false 
statements—other investors may simply have been unwilling to tolerate that 
risk.223  Had the truth been disclosed, these investors would not have bought 
at all.224  They would therefore be entitled to recover for the “consequential” 
damages of the explosion because they could show that they had been forced 
to assume a specific risk they never intended to accept.225  Investors who 
accepted the market judgment did not avoid any particular risk, but instead 
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agreed to pay a certain price for a general risk profile, entitling them only to 
the price revision associated with the true, concealed risk profile.226 
This reasoning does not go so far as to acknowledge the value that 
shareholders add to a company when permitted to exercise their governance 
powers, but it does illustrate that the functional elimination of the reliance 
requirement encourages courts to discount how shareholders individually 
interact with the companies in which they invest.  Moreover, the Fifth 
Circuit’s view has a certain appeal when viewed through a governance lens.  
After all, shareholders who do not directly rely on corporate statements 
cannot be said to have used them when making decisions about participation.  
And shareholders who involve themselves in governance only after a 
purchase—such as investors who buy on an index—do not use the 
governance disclosures for their purchasing decisions.  Returning to Blue 
Chip, these shareholders have not experienced a harm to their governance 
rights in their specific capacity as a purchaser or seller. 
At the same time, however, these purchasers, like all investors, expect that 
they are buying into a particular governance structure and price the securities 
accordingly.  That structure includes the disciplining voice of investors, 
which is then baked into the valuation.  When that voice is denied, even 
shareholders who did not individually rely on the misstatements at the 
moment of purchase experience the harm.  That said, the Fifth Circuit’s 
distinction between actual reliance and fraud-on-the-market reliance is a 
useful starting point for addressing false governance disclosure under section 
10(b).227 
3.  Omissions Liability 
The controversial issue of omissions liability further illustrates courts’ 
discomfort with the use of disclosure standards as a mechanism for involving 
shareholders in governance. 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) forbid both false statements and 
misleading omissions, which are defined generally as “half-truths” that leave 
investors with false impressions of fact.228  Silence, the Supreme Court has 
 
 226. The Fifth Circuit’s view is in line with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
provides that damages for misrepresentation include both the amount of overpayment and the 
“pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient’s reliance upon the 
misrepresentation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); cf. Fisch, 
supra note 71, at 870 (recognizing uncertainty as to how damages should be calculated in 
actual reliance claims).  To be sure, courts used the out-of-pocket damages measure for section 
10(b) claims even before the Supreme Court’s endorsement of fraud-on-the-market theory in 
1988, but it is only in more recent years that courts have made vigorous efforts to distinguish 
between the inflated purchase price and damages caused by worsening underlying conditions. 
See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968) (“It is not until the existence of 
the fraudulent conduct is known that the true value of the securities as an investment can be 
ascertained.”).  Esplin is cited in a leading pre-Dura Pharmacy treatise. See ALAN R. 
BROMBERG, 2 SECURITIES LAW:  FRAUD § 9.1 (1971). 
 227. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 228. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 239–240 (2d Cir. 2016); Berson v. 
Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] statement is misleading if 
it would give a reasonable investor the ‘impression of a state of affairs that differs in a material 
124 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
held, is not misleading “absent a duty to disclose.”229  The question for courts 
has therefore been whether the SEC’s regulatory disclosure requirements 
create a “duty to disclose” such that the failure to speak qualifies as a 
misleading omission.230  If so, this would begin to close the enforcement gap 
that the puffery doctrine has opened and grant shareholders broad powers to 
require disclosure of governance-related information.  This is particularly so 
because different disclosure requirements apply to different types of 
corporate filings, and the blanket application of section 10(b) to omissions 
glosses over these distinctions. 
For example, SEC regulations require that proxy solicitations include a 
variety of governance-related disclosures, such as whether compensation 
policies encourage risk-taking231 and the existence of prior reporting 
violations.232  Some courts have interpreted section 14 to contain vigorous 
affirmative disclosure requirements for proxy solicitations.233  Yet Rule 14a-
9, the only cause of action available to investors for deficient proxy 
disclosures,234 has been interpreted very narrowly.235  If section 10(b) can be 
used for omissions as well as misstatements, the omission of information 
from a proxy statement can be bootstrapped on to a 10(b) claim regardless of 
Rule 14a-9’s limitations.  Similarly, companies have a bevy of affirmative 
disclosure requirements associated with the issuance of new securities, 
including the required disclosure of any material information that has not yet 
been reported.236  Although a narrow cause of action exists for investors who 
purchase securities pursuant to a defective registration statement,237 if section 
10(b) applies to omissions of required information, that cause of action is, in 
a sense, extended to the entire marketplace of securities holders. 
Section 10(b) would always have allowed liability for false statements in 
these documents, but the affirmative disclosure obligations are much broader 
and not subject to evasion via the puffery doctrine.  Thus, courts examining 
omissions claims experience a dilemma similar to that in the puffery context:  
failure to disclose required information may well deceive investors who 
assume from silence that nothing worth reporting exists, but to impose 
liability for omissions based on the mere presumption that the omissions are 
deceptive is nearly indistinguishable from imposing liability for 
mismanagement alone. 
For example, the SEC requires that companies identify “known trends or 
uncertainties” that are expected to impact revenues.238  This item instructs 
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issuers to disclose a wide array of potential future events, unless the issuer 
determines that the event is “not reasonably likely to occur.”239  In the face 
of such obligations, the distinction between imposing liability for silence 
about poor managerial decision-making and imposing liability for the 
decision-making itself may be “no sharper than that between twilight and 
dusk.”240  However, to exempt such requirements from private lawsuits 
necessarily leaves a gap in the enforcement regime—one that is 
disproportionately likely to affect the types of “soft” governance-related 
information that issuers can more easily omit from their filings. 
Given this dilemma, it is not surprising that circuits are split as to whether 
omissions liability should be permitted at all.241  As of this writing, the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the split.242  If the Court 
holds that the omission of information can serve as the basis of a fraud-on-
the-market section 10(b) claim, lower courts are likely to continue to police 
the governance-disclosure distinction by narrowing their interpretations of 
corporations’ primary disclosure obligations.  Such an outcome would 
represent the worst of all worlds:  it would directly interfere with federal 
efforts to encourage governance disclosures and render the regime 
impossible to police by shareholders or even by government authorities. 
IV.  SHAREHOLDER PREFERENCES AS 
IMPOSED BY THE JUDICIARY 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, courts have developed a variety 
of tools to distinguish claims rooted in deception from claims rooted in 
governance without explicit reference to the element of reliance.  These tools, 
operating in broad strokes, tend to devalue disclosures designed to empower 
shareholders within the corporate form, thus impeding federal efforts to 
include shareholders in the governance project. 
The consequences go beyond inhibiting shareholders’ ability to minimize 
agency costs.  As federal law increasingly takes a hands-off approach to 
regulation of corporate conduct, many theorists have turned to shareholders 
as a potential moderating force that, working within the corporate structure, 
can help to police antisocial behavior and curb corporate externalities.  But, 
as explained below, the judiciary has carved into section 10(b) doctrine a 
particular vision of the shareholder as amoral and short-term, with no 
interests beyond the maximization of the stock price of the firm at issue.243  
Such a portrait is not only factually inaccurate, but stands in opposition to the 
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NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 242. SAIC, 818 F.3d 85, cert. granted sub nom., Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. 
Ct. 1395 (Mar. 27, 2017) (No. 16-581). 
 243. See infra Part IV.A. 
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ethos of modern attempts to enlist stockholders as a moderating force in the 
corporate governance structure. 
A.  Shareholders:  Victims or Enablers? 
In recent years, there has been a particular disenchantment with direct 
government regulation as a mechanism for curbing corporate externalities.244  
Corporations that operate internationally may be beyond the power of any 
one country to control, the complexity of corporate systems may exceed 
regulators’ comprehension, and political gridlock may stifle attempts to adapt 
regulations to a changing world.245  The new presidential administration and 
Congress have already exhibited a preference for deregulation on the theory 
that federal regulation is not only ineffective, but actively anticompetitive 
and inimical to growth.246 
As a result, some reformers have sought to curb corporate externalities by 
manipulating the balance of power within the corporate form itself.  In 
particular, commentators argue that shareholders, given the appropriate 
incentives and powers, can serve as a restraining influence, encouraging 
prosocial behavior and discouraging antisocial conduct.247  The assumption 
underlying these efforts is that antisocial corporate behavior is a species of 
agency cost.  Under this view, the dispersed shareholders of a public 
corporation are left without power or incentive to monitor their agents 
(directors and officers),248 and, as a result, are victimized by corporate 
managers who engage in socially irresponsible behavior. 
The precise manner in which corporate misbehavior victimizes investors 
is articulated in different ways.  Sometimes, it is argued that antisocial 
conduct is simply a counterproductive way of doing business, resulting in 
short-term gains at the expense of longer-term corporate health.249  
 
 244. Pargendler, supra note 83, at 365. 
 245. Id.  See generally Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567 
(2013); Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 
35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and 
the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533 (2015). 
 246. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos & Andrew Tangel, Donald Trump’s Cabinet Selections 
Signal Deregulation Moves Are Coming, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-signal-deregulation-moves-are-
coming-1481243006 [https://perma.cc/GL4L-WRRH]. 
 247. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 184–89; Barnali Choudhury, Social 
Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 216 (2016); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related 
Activism:  The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 651 
(2016); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 
10 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 64 (2005); Pargendler, supra note 83, at 378–96; Gretchen 
Morgenson, Want Change?:  Shareholders Have a Tool for That, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/business/proxy-climate-change-executive-pay.html 
[https://perma.cc/G2RA-PJ29].  The idea dates back at least to the original passage of the 
Securities Act when theorists proposed that advisory councils recommend to shareholders how 
to vote their shares in the public interest. See Mitchell, supra note 114, at 1545. 
 248. Technically, directors are not agents of shareholders, in part because shareholders 
wield such little power in the corporate structure. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 
cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
 249. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 189–90.  Various studies purport to show 
how attention to externalities, at least along some dimensions, can also lead to greater 
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Shareholders, misled as to the nature of the business, overvalue the company 
and are harmed when the truth is revealed, the improper conduct halted, and 
corporate penalties and fines imposed.  Shareholders may also be harmed to 
the extent the corporation suffers reputational damage and endures the 
expense and disruption associated with legal action, changes in personnel, 
and new compliance costs.  Particularly egregious conduct may prompt 
regulatory responses that further hamper the business.250 
Alternatively, shareholders may be harmed in their nonshareholder 
capacities, even if the externality-generating behavior benefits the corporate 
entity itself.  Shareholders who are members of the surrounding community 
may be harmed by corporate pollution.251  Shareholder-employees may be 
harmed by exploitatively low wages and poor working conditions.252  
Shareholder-citizens may be harmed to the extent they object to corporate 
practices, such as political donations in favor of causes with which they 
disagree or that can work to their detriment.253  Shareholders may also be 
harmed in their capacity as investors in other companies.  Some shareholders, 
for example, invest in a wide variety of companies, and therefore “own[] the 
economy.”254  For such investors, the externality-generating conduct of one 
company may harm their other investments, ultimately harming their 
 
shareholder returns. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 247, at 213; Ho, supra note 247, at 665–
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2149–51 (2014). 
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Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1981). 
 254. Anabtawi, supra note 109, at 583 (quoting JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. 
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Competition, and Top Management Incentives (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 
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[https://perma.cc/XBS4-ZGV3]; Andriy Bodnaruk & Marco Rossi, Dual Ownership, Returns, 
and Voting in Mergers (Feb. 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348094 [https://perma.cc/9P88-
VVJD]; Chris Brooks et al., Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy:  The Case 
of Mergers and Acquisitions (Dec. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747036 [https://perma.cc/ZM7U-
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portfolio overall, assuming that the gains to the antisocial corporations are 
not symmetric with the harms to others.255 
Though these descriptive accounts differ as to the source of the shareholder 
harm, they ultimately come to the same conclusion:  at least some forms of 
antisocial corporate conduct are contrary to shareholders’ interests, and 
shareholders, if given sufficient power within the corporate structure, can 
serve as a mitigating influence. 
That said, these relatively benign views of how shareholders might utilize 
enhanced power within the corporate structure are not free from 
controversy.256  Many commentators argue that corporate managers simply 
respond to market incentives.  Shareholders vote for directors—thereby 
ratifying their decisions—and reward high profits with high stock prices.  
Institutional shareholders must respond to the demands of their beneficiaries 
who expect to see immediate short-term increases in the value of their 
holdings.257  Diversified shareholders in particular value risk-taking and 
reward managers who externalize costs.258  In this model, shareholders 
benefit from, and bear a moral responsibility for, harms inflicted by the 
corporation on the wider society.259  Risk-taking and lawbreaking are not 
 
 255. See, e.g., Barbara Novick, How Index Funds Democratize Investing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-index-funds-democratize-investing-1483914571 
[https://perma.cc/N26H-3G7W] (arguing that BlackRock asset managers would not favor 
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airlines it would place additional burdens on virtually all other industries in which BlackRock 
invests). 
 256. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder:  Shareholder Power and 
Shareholder Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (Jennifer G. 
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (describing how shareholders can alternatively be 
characterized as victims of rapacious managers, checks on managerial overreach, or enablers 
of misbehavior). 
 257. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 
930–36 (2013). 
 258. See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 44 (2014); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 
35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (1982); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the 
Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 138 (2012). 
 259. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:  MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS 75 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935) (“There is no such thing . . . as an innocent 
stockholder.  He may be innocent in fact, but socially he cannot be held innocent.  He accepts 
the benefits of a system.  It is his business and his obligation to see that those who represent 
him carry out a policy which is consistent with the public welfare.”); see also In re Massey 
Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n.185 
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“The primary protection for stockholders against incompetent 
management is selecting new directors.  It may well be that the corporate law does not make 
stockholders whole . . . when it is alleged that corporate managers skirted laws protecting other 
constituencies in order to generate higher profits for the stockholders . . . .  Remember that to 
the extent that Massey kept costs lower and exposed miners and the environment to excess 
dangers, Massey’s stockholders enjoyed the short-term benefits in the form of higher profits.  
The very reason for laws protecting other constituencies is that those who own businesses 
stand to gain more if they can keep the operation’s profits and externalize the costs.  Thus, the 
stockholders of corporations, especially given the short-term nature of holding periods that 
now predominate in our markets, have poor incentives to monitor corporate compliance with 
laws protecting society as a whole and may well put strong pressures on corporate 
management to produce immediate profits.”). 
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agency costs; they are the natural result of corporate managers responding to 
the desires of the corporation’s owners. 
It is self-evident that shareholders have interests beyond their status as 
investors in a particular company and may, therefore, prefer that corporations 
not maximize their own wealth if doing so would damage these interests.  
Therefore, the above argument frequently is accompanied by the corollary 
that when shareholders vote to advance their parochial interests over the 
corporate good, other shareholders—and the enterprise itself—will be 
exploited.260  This problem has been recognized and accounted for in the 
context of controlling shareholders,261 but it may arise even for shareholders 
with a minority stake.  Union shareholders, for example, may try to extract 
concessions for employees,262 employee-shareholders may resist hostile 
takeovers,263 hedge funds may advocate for forms of financial engineering 
that leech immediate value from the company,264 public pension funds may 
encourage firms to engage in political activism,265 and bondholders who also 
own stock may use their equity positions to increase the value of their debt 
holdings.266 These moves may benefit certain shareholders—and more 
broadly, the classes of interests of which they are a part—even as they 
damage the corporation as a whole.  In other words, the very ESG project is 
itself viewed with suspicion because it may enable some shareholders to use 
the corporate form to advance their idiosyncratic preferences to the detriment 
of other shareholders. 
B.  A Perfect Storm in Section 10(b) 
Section 10(b) represents a perfect storm of conflicted portraits of the role 
of the shareholder in corporate governance, where prospective investors are 
envisioned as vulnerable to corporate wrongdoing until a purchase is 
completed, at which point they immediately become complicit in that 
wrongdoing.  One the one hand, to the extent shareholders are granted a cause 
of action against the entity for the fraud of its agents, shareholders are treated 
as victims of the corporation.  On the other hand, because damages are paid 
by the corporation itself, the costs of the lawsuit are borne by the corporate 
entity, and, ultimately, its shareholders—suggesting that shareholders are in 
some sense enablers of, or responsible for, the losses.267 
 
 260. Anabtawi, supra note 109, at 575–93. 
 261. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
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Neither, of course, is strictly true.  Not every prospective investor is a 
stranger to the corporate polity.  Investors frequently maintain positions in 
companies while buying and selling smaller amounts of their holdings.  As a 
result, investors continuously have one foot in and one foot out.  Moreover, 
the investor’s purchase simultaneously consummates the fraud (for that 
particular investor) and assists in its accomplishment (by pushing prices 
higher for other investors).268 
Fraud-on-the-market exacerbates these tensions.  With the element of 
reliance functionally eliminated and the focus on the underlying business 
practice rather than the corporate disclosures, the section 10(b) action raises 
the specter of awarding damages to shareholders who raised no objection 
to—or even implicitly encouraged—the conduct that led to the loss based on 
an ex ante calculation that the potential benefits outweighed the risk.  
Permitting lawsuits when those problems come to light creates a moral 
hazard.269  At the same time, it would be detrimental to the enterprise as a 
whole to rigorously enforce a pretense of virtue favored only by a small 
minority of investors. 
This is what courts are implying when they caution against section 10(b) 
becoming a form of “investor insurance.”270  Indeed, courts have explicitly 
declared that investors prefer risk and that securities laws should not be used 
to stifle that preference, even to the point of suggesting that investors want to 
see managers break the law on their behalf.271 
Courts examining section 10(b) claims must navigate this dilemma.  If 
shareholders transform governance disputes into claims ostensibly rooted in 
deception, necessarily tasking courts with distinguishing “true” deception 
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supra Part I. 
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labor law violations in part because their actions may have been “intended for the 
corporation’s benefit” (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d. Cir. 1979))); 
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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claims from illusory ones, then courts must pinpoint the degree of corporate 
misconduct that shareholders are deemed to expect—and, indeed favor—on 
the assumption that shareholders will not rely upon any denials of misconduct 
that fall below that level.  But when that threshold is breached, corporate 
misbehavior is no longer conducted with tacit shareholder approval.  Instead, 
it stands in opposition to their interests and expectations, marking the point 
at which shareholders may be deceived by denials of wrongdoing. 
Thus, when it comes to claims based on corporate misconduct and 
antisocial behavior, identifying true instances of deception requires courts to 
determine what level of corporate misconduct shareholders can be expected 
to accept.  Essentially, courts must decide the background factual 
assumptions that shareholders make about the companies in which they 
invest and determine when a deviation from those assumptions reaches the 
point of becoming misleading.  Courts must police the line between deception 
and governance by making a judgment about the kind of unethical behavior 
in pursuit of greater profits that is considered unremarkable.  And the very 
fact of doing so requires courts to take a side in the above debate.  That is, 
courts must develop a vision of what shareholders value when making an 
investment decision.  Or, more accurately, courts must develop a vision of 
what shareholders will be permitted to value, such that their interests will be 
judicially acknowledged. 
This is accomplished in the first instance by malleable and inconsistent 
approaches to the puffery doctrine.  As explained above, puffery is typically 
defined as a species of immateriality:  certain statements are so hyperbolic or 
mundane that investors are unlikely to give them any weight.272  Employing 
this definition, courts can dismiss claims that appear to be objections more to 
the quality of the underlying governance than to the misstatement itself. 
That said, courts have the option of moderating their approach to puffery 
when the behavior seems beyond the bounds that even amoral shareholders 
would tolerate—namely, by offering a different definition of puffery itself.  
For example, in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities Litigation,273 
investors alleged that Countrywide Mortgage (a company that later became 
notorious for issuing mortgages to unsuitable borrowers) falsely described its 
core mortgage operations as sound.274  In a lengthy discussion, the court held: 
The federal securities laws do not create liability for poor business 
judgment or failed operations.  Nor do the laws require public companies 
to disclose every change in operations.  But the [Complaint’s] allegations 
present the extraordinary case where a company’s essential operations 
were so at odds with the company’s public statements that many statements 
that would not be actionable in the vast majority of cases are rendered 
cognizable to the securities laws. 
 For example, descriptions such as “high quality” are generally not 
actionable; they are vague and subjective puffery not capable of being 
material as a matter of law.  On an individual level, this is because a 
 
 272. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 273. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 274. See id. at 1153–56. 
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reasonable person would not rely on such descriptions; on a macro scale, 
the statements will have little price effect because the market will discount 
them.  However, the [Complaint] adequately alleges that Countrywide’s 
practices so departed from its public statements that even “high quality” 
became materially false or misleading; and that to apply the puffery rule to 
such allegations would deny that “high quality” has any meaning.275 
Here, the court begins by describing puffery as a species of materiality, 
such that puffing statements simply cannot affect stock prices, but ends by 
altering the definition to be rooted in falsity, theorizing that puffing 
statements are ones that are so vague that they could still be truthful for a 
wide range of underlying conditions.276  When those conditions are so 
extreme as to fall outside the bounds of even broad representations that the 
company had adopted a “quality control process” to “improve 
consistency,”277 a fraud claim can proceed.278 
The switch from a reliance interpretation of puffery to a falsity one is 
fraught with governance implications.  If one assumes—as most courts do—
that puffing statements are ubiquitous, and if one assumes—as most courts 
do, including the Countrywide court—that investors do not take these 
statements seriously, then the reinterpretation of puffery suggests that 
corporations are free to engage in unethical, risky, or illegal behavior, until 
they cross a particularly extreme line, outside the bounds of how shareholders 
would ordinarily expect corporations to behave.  At that point, it is not so 
much the company’s statements, but its business model that acts as a fraud 
on shareholders; its mere existence on the market in the guise of a legitimate 
investment becomes actionable under section 10(b).  And, in fact, some 
courts have come close to making this reasoning explicit.279 
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 279. Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 312 F.R.D. 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that a case 
alleging corporate ethical failures was rooted more in its omissions—its failure to 
affirmatively confess to the misconduct—than its misstatements about integrity); see also 
Bach v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 10-00395-BAJ-RLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111077, at *35–36 
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This reasoning further suggests that courts draw a crude line between 
antisocial behavior that shareholders are deemed to buy into by virtue of their 
participation in the marketplace (antisocial behavior that is conducted on 
shareholders’ behalf) and more extreme forms of antisocial behavior that puts 
management at odds with shareholders, to the point where shareholders are 
no longer the architects of management misconduct, but the victims of it.  At 
that point, courts can trust that even in the absence of evidence of reliance, 
shareholders were, in fact, deceived, so that puffery makes way for a viable 
section 10(b) claim. 
Omissions liability and loss causation present courts with similar 
dilemmas.  In both situations, courts must engage with a hypothetical 
alternative world in which the truth had been disclosed and determine how 
shareholders would have reacted.  Courts must gauge whether shareholders 
expected or encouraged the concealed (and presumably, negative) 
behavior—and they may conclude that they did.  For example, in several 
cases involving for-profit colleges, shareholders alleged that the defendants 
failed to disclose unethical or illegal recruiting methods and students’ 
inability to pay tuition.280  Courts responded by suggesting that the omitted 
tactics were ones that investors should have expected given the nature of the 
industry—or even that investors should have favored them.281  One case held 
that statements inflating the quality of education provided might be sufficient 
for an enrollee to bring a fraud claim, but as to investors constituted 
puffery—presumably because stockholders would have no interest in (or 
perhaps would even expect) the exploitation of students.282  Other courts 
have simply imposed special burdens on claims regarding ethical conduct:  
such claims may proceed, but only if the defendant explicitly attributes its 
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financial success to its ethics.283  Once again, these holdings create a 
doctrinal principle that investors only concern themselves with ethics in 
certain narrow circumstances, typically tied to short-term financial gain. 
Courts use the definition of scienter to similar effect.  Section 10(b) only 
prohibits intentional or reckless conduct,284 but courts offer varying 
explanations as to what precisely the defendant must intend or be recklessly 
indifferent about.  Usually, the defendant must simply intend to mislead 
investors, on the theory that section 10(b), and federal law generally, seeks 
to protect the accuracy of information used to value securities.  Thus, in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson,285 the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that 
their false statements had been intended to protect shareholders.286  It held 
that “creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a prodisclosure 
legislative philosophy, because complying with the regulation might be ‘bad 
for business,’ is a role for Congress, not this Court.”287  In Nakkhumpun v. 
Taylor,288 the Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion, holding that, 
whatever the defendant’s ultimate motive, section 10(b) liability would be 
imposed if he intentionally or recklessly misled investors.289 
But in other situations, courts reinterpret scienter to mean not merely an 
intention to mislead investors but to defraud them.  For example, in ECA & 
Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,290 the 
plaintiff-stockholders of JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) claimed that the bank had 
assisted Enron’s fraud by disguising loans to Enron as derivative trades so 
that Enron could appear to its own shareholders as having less debt than was 
actually the case.291  The fraud was intended to enable Enron to falsify its 
own financial statements, but a necessary consequence was that JPMC itself 
falsely listed the loans as trades in its own SEC filings.292  When JPMC’s 
role in Enron’s fraud was disclosed, its stock price fell, harming its own 
shareholders.293  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs 
failed to allege scienter against JPMC because they did not 
show an intent to defraud JPMC’s shareholders rather than Enron’s 
shareholders. . . .  Indeed, Plaintiffs have argued that JPMC concealed its 
transactions with Enron in return for excessive fees . . . .  It seems 
implausible to have both an intent to earn excessive fees for the corporation 
and also an intent to defraud Plaintiffs by losing vast sums of money.294 
 
 283. See, e.g., Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Avon Prods., No. 11 CI 4665, 2014 WL 4832321, at 
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2014); In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL 
4471265, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012). 
 284. Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 285. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 286. Id. at 239 n.17. 
 287. Id. 
 288. 782 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 289. Id. at 1150. 
 290. 553 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 291. Id. at 193–95. 
 292. Id. at 195–96. 
 293. Id. at 194.  
 294. Id. at 203.  Other decisions have followed a similar pattern. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local 
No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corp., 499 F. App’x 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2012) (no scienter 
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In other words, the Second Circuit modified the definition of scienter to 
distinguish between misbehavior done on shareholders’ behalf and 
misbehavior that positioned managers as adverse to shareholders.  The key 
assumption underlying this move is that shareholders welcome attempts to 
increase their wealth by any means necessary.  The inclination, then, is to 
assume that shareholders are short-term wealth seekers to the exclusion of 
other concerns.  Courts’ unstated assumptions stand in direct opposition to 
efforts to utilize shareholders as a disciplining influence on corporate 
behavior. 
This is not to say that courts reject all claims based on undisclosed 
misconduct intended to maximize shareholder wealth; to the contrary, many 
such claims succeed.295  The point is that the tools developed to police the 
distinction between disclosure and governance can easily be, and often are, 
used to inscribe into legal doctrine a conception of shareholders as risk-
seeking, short-term-wealth maximizing, and amoral—precisely the opposite 
of the kind of shareholder who might act to curb antisocial corporate 
tendencies. 
One irony of this approach is that in courts’ zeal to police the 
governance/deception line, they have come close to reviving the now-defunct 
“fraud created the market” doctrine.  As described above, in the absence of 
market efficiency, shareholders generally cannot win the presumption of 
reliance that permits them to bring claims on a class basis.296  For a time, 
courts accepted “fraud created the market” as an alternative.  Under this 
theory, regardless of the efficiency of the market, investors are entitled to 
presume that publicly traded securities are not so deficient as to be essentially 
unmarketable.297  When undisclosed problems reach that level of severity, 
the security’s mere existence on the market, masquerading as a legitimate 
purchase, works a deception. 
The fraud created the market doctrine has been rejected in most modern 
decisions,298 but when courts distinguish between shareholder-favored and 
 
alleged against executive who falsified accounting entries because she “acted with the intent 
to maintain the good appearance of her department rather than to defraud investors”); Doshi 
v. Gen. Cable Corp., No. 2:14-cv-22(WOB-CJS), 2015 WL 366644, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 
2015) (“Although Sandoval may have been aware of problems and failed to disclose them, 
there are no facts to support that he did so with intent to defraud.  Instead, the allegations 
support an inference that his intent was one shared by most corporate executives:  to be 
profitable and achieve business goals.”). 
 295. See, e.g., Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., N.V., No. 15-CV-7199(JMF), 2016 WL 
5818590, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2016). 
 296. Occasionally, plaintiffs can obtain a presumption of reliance for claims based on 
omissions, rather than affirmative misstatements. See infra Part V.A.3. 
 297. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2000).  In some formulations, 
investors are entitled to believe that the regulatory regime and the process involved in bringing 
securities to market protect against the sale of completely valueless or unmarketable securities. 
See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th 
Cir. 1983). 
 298. See, e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120–
21 (2d Cir. 2014); Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d 
1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2013); Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751–52 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
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shareholder-disfavored business models, its spirit lives on.  Courts are 
reluctant to permit liability for concealed misconduct deemed to be within a 
rational, wealth-maximizing investors’ risk tolerance, but when the risks 
plainly exceed what any investor would want, investors change status from 
enablers to victims.  Then, courts functionally will allow fraud claims to be 
pursued even in the absence of statements that, in another context, would be 
deemed deceptive. 
V.  REVIVING RELIANCE 
Today, disclosure does more work than it has done in the past, and the 
private rights of action were not designed for its new role.  Yet even within 
current doctrinal constraints, efforts to enhance shareholders’ ability to 
influence corporate governance are stymied by courts’ distrust of the project.  
This distrust is fueled by concerns about the potential for shareholder abuse, 
courts’ uncertainties about whether federal law should be regulating 
governance, and courts’ judgment that investors are indifferent to externality-
generating behavior.  Courts’ constrained view of deception and damage 
threatens to become even more consequential in coming years, as it is likely 
the federal government will retrench from command-and-control style 
regulation in favor of self-regulation and market constraints.  Shareholders 
may become an important component of these alternative regulatory 
mechanisms and, therefore, their right to participate in corporate governance 
deserves a vigorous defense. 
A.  Distinguishing Between Actual Reliance and 
Fraud-on-the-Market Claims 
As described above, decades ago, the legal system opted for deterrence 
over compensation as a mechanism for enforcing the securities laws.299  In 
other words, monetary damages are emphasized as a “stick” that discourages 
bad behavior, with only after-the-fact legal fees offered to attorneys as the 
“carrot” for bringing the claim.  But when shareholders are viewed as part of 
the governance structure the compensation rationale takes on additional 
importance as a “carrot” to encourage shareholders to shoulder the burdens 
of these responsibilities in the first place.  It has long been assumed that 
shareholders have little reason to monitor corporate managers because they 
bear the expenses of doing so but capture only a small portion of the 
benefits.300  Institutional investors’ large stakes, coupled with their lower 
monitoring costs, may have changed the calculus,301 but the costs have not 
been entirely eliminated and surely remain a barrier to participation.  Thus, 
if shareholders are to participate fully in the corporate enterprise—and serve 
as a force to reign in managerial misconduct—it is particularly important that 
 
 299. See supra Part I.B. 
 300. See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital:  Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 834 (2007). 
 301. See supra Part II. 
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the legal system find ways to encourage investor participation and fully 
reimburse investors’ losses when they are misled. 
Previous commentators have singled out active traders as especially 
deserving of compensation in section 10(b) actions, though their particular 
recommendations have varied.  The basic insight is that active trading 
incorporates information into stock prices, which benefits both passive 
investors and the economy generally.  Active traders who perform this task 
take disproportionate risks in the form of lack of diversification.  They 
therefore are more entitled to damages when corporate information proves to 
be false than are passive investors.302  Moreover, to the extent all 
shareholders pay when a corporation is forced to fund fraud-on-the-market 
damages, it is appropriate that passive investors fund a kind of investor 
insurance that is more likely to benefit active investors.303 
But actual reliance has a further benefit:  it is a precondition for 
participating in corporate governance.  To the extent shareholders are misled, 
they cannot perform their monitoring function.  It is therefore appropriate to 
enhance remedies to shareholders who take their monitoring role seriously 
and—to the extent those payments are funded by the corporate entity—to 
indirectly tax the remaining investors for a service that federal law 
encourages them to perform.  Additionally, imposing a reliance requirement 
minimizes the chance that investors who enabled the problem will still be 
able to collect “investor insurance” damages when the risks did not pan out.  
Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the section 10(b) action could be 
altered to provide greater rights to investors who can establish actual 
reliance.304  These greater rights, described in more detail in the sections that 
follow, could then serve as an incentive for institutions both to monitor such 
disclosures and to enforce them after the fact. 
Courts’ suspicion of section 10(b) claims is at least partly rooted in the 
functional elimination of the element of reliance.  When reliance is presumed 
from surrounding facts, courts must be wary of allowing the presumption on 
a hair trigger, particularly given the conflicting incentives facing 
shareholders in the context of corporate misconduct.  But if investor reliance 
is restored as an integral part of the cause of action and must be established 
by the plaintiff, courts can be confident that investors were, in fact, deceived, 
without the necessity of making value judgments regarding the types of 
conduct investors might tacitly encourage. 
 
 302. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud 
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 101–02 (2011) (arguing that only active traders should 
receive section 10(b) damages); A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II:  A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE 
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 51 (2015) (same). 
 303. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 347–50 (noting that holders who cannot recover provide insurance for 
the benefits conferred by active traders); James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as 
Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 342–44 (2009) (same). 
 304. In this context, reliance should be interpreted to include investors who outsource 
decisions to advisors, who themselves rely on corporate misstatements.  Reliance should also 
be defined to include computer algorithms that include such statements in trading decisions. 
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Importantly, however, these investors should not be required to establish 
that they would not have bought at all had they known the truth, or that they 
would have bought at a different price, because such a high burden would be 
difficult (if not impossible) to meet.  Instead, the only inquiry should be 
whether the challenged statements factored favorably into their investment 
decision.  Reliance, under this standard, would operate like a subjective 
version of the standard test for materiality.  Such a shift would capture the 
reality that even when investors cannot identify a single statement as the but-
for cause of their purchasing decisions, corporate representations may still 
play a role in the investment process.  Investors who can make this more 
moderate showing are likely to continue to monitor corporate representations 
in their capacity as shareholders and engage as necessary when corporate 
managers veer into more dangerous territory.  If the goal of increased liability 
is to reward investors who purchase with the intention to monitor the quality 
of governance, requiring investors to demonstrate attention to the relevant 
issues is all that should be required. 
To be sure, it may be somewhat counterintuitive to rely on active traders 
to police governance disclosures because their interests may diverge from 
those who buy stock in a particular company and maintain their position.305  
Yet the divergence may not be that stark.  Even investors who expect to take 
a long-term position are likely to periodically buy and sell in accordance with 
various investment strategies.306  Thus, despite their status as traders, which 
entitles them to damages under Blue Chip,307 they may also maintain an 
interest in corporate governance. 
Moreover, most institutional investors are intermediaries; they manage 
money for beneficiaries, such as retirees.  If these institutions disclose their 
participation in section 10(b) litigation and any recovery (or better yet, if they 
are required to do so),308 investors can determine if they are, in fact, 
monitoring corporate management and thereby detect shirking.309  
Institutions may improve their own monitoring functions so that they can 
demonstrate reliance should the need arise—with the beneficial side effect of 
correcting problems before they begin.  Indeed, one study found that 
particular institutions tend to be “bad” monitors; they end up investing in 
more firms targeted for litigation than do other investors, suggesting they are 
 
 305. Cf. Park, supra note 22, at 146 (highlighting the divergent interests between 
stockholders-as-owners and stockholders-as-traders). 
 306. See, e.g., Collier v. ModusLink Glob. Sols., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2014). 
 307. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 308. Currently, that data is not publicly available.  In one study, researchers had to contact 
settlement administrators to collect it. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 78, at 413. 
 309. Some have argued that mutual funds have little incentive to monitor management 
because the benefits are distributed to all stockholders, including competing funds. See 
Fischel, supra note 258, at 1276–77; Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of 
Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1824 (2011).  Experience 
appears to have demonstrated that funds do, in fact, engage in monitoring, see supra Part II, 
though perhaps less than they would if they were not mindful of competitors.  An “actual 
reliance” damage award might allow more vigorous monitors to differentiate themselves from 
other funds while partially compensating their costs. 
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failing to use the tools at their disposal.310  The incentives provided by these 
proposed alterations to section 10(b) doctrine may improve the situation. 
That said, one of the barriers to bringing actual reliance claims is that they 
cannot be certified for class treatment and the expenses of individual actions 
are high.311  Those expenses can be minimized, however, when the individual 
action is tied to a class claim, and the individual can utilize discovery 
obtained in the class action.  Increasingly, institutional investors are choosing 
to opt out of class actions and coordinate with the class in hopes that they can 
win higher settlements.312  Though these investors frequently rely on the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption, many also allege that they actually relied 
on the false statements.313  If they knew they could collect additional 
damages by claiming actual reliance, more investors would be incentivized 
to do so,314 and actual reliance claims would be more feasible. 
An even more attractive alternative would be to litigate class actions in the 
expectation that some investors may be entitled to receive “actual reliance” 
damages.  Classes could be certified for specific issues under Rule 23(c)315 
so as to allow reliance and damages to be segmented out.  Investors who 
claim they actually relied on a misstatement could prove that fact in separate 
trials, while the remainder of the class would have reliance determined using 
a fraud-on-the-market theory.  These kinds of flexible procedures are often 
employed in complex class actions.316  Because few shareholders are likely 
to take advantage of the actual reliance option, and those who do are likely 
to have comparatively large stakes, designing class procedures in this manner 
would impose minimal additional burdens, while avoiding any frictions that 
might arise when investors bring entirely separate actions.317 
 
 310. See, e.g., Chishen Wei & Lei Zhang, Identifying Ineffective Monitors from Securities 
Class Action Lawsuits 2 (Nov. 28, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
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 316. See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2004); Mullen v. 
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 317. These procedures might also mitigate any tensions between institutional investors, 
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simply submitting damages claims in larger class actions with proof of their own reliance. 
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A proposed framework for adjusting the section 10(b) cause of action to 
distinguish between actual reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims 
involves redesigning puffery, loss causation and damages, omissions, and 
claims for securities holders.  This framework recognizes the value of 
governance-related disclosures and investors’ role in the corporate structure. 
1.  Redesigning Puffery 
The puffery doctrine, which disproportionately devalues governance-
related disclosures,318 should be adjusted.  There are at least two potential 
paths for reform. 
First, and most obviously, the doctrine could be entirely eliminated for 
investors who allege actual reliance.  Courts apply the puffery doctrine with 
a special vigor in the context of section 10(b) due to courts’ fear that fraud-
on-the-market liability could become entirely decoupled from affirmative 
disclosures.319  This is simply not a concern for investors who demonstrate 
actual reliance on the alleged misstatement. 
The shift would not be as dramatic as it sounds.  Though materiality—of 
which puffery is a facet—is ostensibly defined by reference to an objective, 
“reasonable person” standard,320 courts have long been in the habit of tacitly 
adjusting their definitions of materiality to match the circumstances of 
targeted investors.321  Eliminating the puffery concept entirely when actual 
reliance has been established would simply make the practice more explicit. 
A broader solution would be to revise the doctrine across the board, even 
in fraud-on-the-market cases.  It may not be feasible to jettison the doctrine 
entirely, for precisely the reasons it was first adopted, but it can be reoriented 
to explicitly focus on falsity rather than the presumed immateriality to 
investors.  Rather than gauging whether the statements are too vague for 
shareholders to rely upon—or less logically, whether they are unreliable 
because of their similarity to statements issued by comparable companies—
courts should focus on whether the tone of the statement was significantly at 
odds with the underlying facts.  The focus should be on the nexus between 
the statements and the aspect of the business being challenged.  Under this 
test, general positive statements about the business would not be rendered 
false by problems confined to one small segment unless those problems are 
extremely severe.  The more hyperbolic the language used, the more likely it 
would be rendered false by smaller or more confined problems.  The balance 
would be between the generality of the statement, the tone of the statement, 
and the generality and severity of the underlying problem.  Courts should be 
comfortable employing this analysis because it is quite similar to the test for 
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materiality generally, which involves a balance of the probability of a 
contingent event relative to its magnitude.322 
This approach would discourage disappointed investors from using section 
10(b) as “investor’s insurance,” while at the same time preventing courts 
from making armchair judgments about the significance information might 
hold to a hypothetical investor.323  It would also recognize what we 
understand intuitively and has been documented by researchers324—that 
investors respond to the degree of enthusiasm with which corporate opinions 
are expressed.  Investors treat mild statements of self-praise differently from 
more extreme statements, and a revised puffery doctrine that focuses on the 
disparity between the statement and the underlying truth would capture this 
reality.  For example, claims based on an ethics policy would not be 
dismissed merely because the policy was aspirational.325  Instead, courts 
would consider whether, given the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing relative 
to the business or the knowledge of senior management, the company was 
not, in fact, even aspiring to meet the terms of its own policy.326 
2.  Actual Reliance and Loss Causation 
Reformation of the puffery doctrine, however, would not completely 
resolve the issue.  Loss causation and damages, omissions liability, and Blue 
Chip standing requirements continue to block compensation to investors who 
misdirect their governance efforts due to false statements or material 
omissions.  For these elements, taking a page out of the Fifth Circuit’s 
playbook in BP, investors who actually relied on the misstatement could 
collect “materialization of the risk” damages, incurred as a consequence of 
the fraud or the conditions it concealed.327  Such a shift would reward 
investors who take an active interest in the quality of the corporate 
governance and compensate them for governance-related losses they incur 
when their ability to participate is stymied. 
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Notably, this shift would allow damages to be awarded even for 
misstatements that do not impact (or cannot be proved to have impacted) the 
security’s price.  As described above, part of the theory as to why investors 
care about governance is less about stockholder wealth maximization than 
the advancement of other values.328  Courts have demonstrated at least some 
degree of resistance to recognizing such values legally, and to the extent they 
are correct that external concerns do not influence stock prices, investors may 
have difficulty using fraud-on-the-market theory to bring claims based on 
false corporate pretensions to ethical behavior.  If damages are awarded based 
on actual reliance, however, it is less important that the market as a whole 
take the information into account. 
For example, suppose a company makes false statements about a 
commitment to diversity in hiring.  The statements have little (provable) 
impact on price because, as rational wealth maximizers, most shareholders 
are uninterested in diversity.  Yet some class of investors relies on those 
statements.  Later, the company reveals the statement to be false when it 
announces that it is the target of a class action lawsuit for racial 
discrimination and its stock price falls.  Under the current section 10(b) 
regime, no investor could collect damages because no investor could show 
that the price they paid for their shares was higher than its true value at the 
time of purchase.  But if damages could be awarded to investors who relied 
on the false claims, regardless of price impact at the time of the initial lie, 
they would be compensated for some of their monitoring costs.329  Such a 
regime would further the federal interest in encouraging stockholders to take 
an interest in issuers that advance moral causes even when they do not 
directly contribute to stockholder wealth. 
One point of objection might be that these are governance damages, rooted 
in the notion that managers mismanaged the corporation, thus causing losses 
to the entity directly and to shareholders indirectly.  As such, they already are 
remediable in derivative actions under state law.  Shareholders may step into 
the shoes of the corporate entity and bring claims against faithless managers 
on the entity’s behalf, with damages returned to the entity itself.330  Richard 
Booth, for example, has argued that many section 10(b) claims should more 
properly be characterized as derivative actions.331  Derivative actions, 
however, do not recognize the precise harm described here:  managerial 
misstatements that have the effect of denying shareholders their role in the 
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VA. L & BUS. REV. 37, 40 (2015). 
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governance structure.  The harm is not merely that managers damaged the 
company; it is that managers denied shareholders the opportunity for input.  
That harm is personal to the investor. 
Additionally, plaintiffs may only pursue derivative actions if corporate 
directors are operating under a conflict that prevents them from bringing the 
claims on the corporation’s behalf.332  This point is central to the notion of a 
derivative action:  directors are the only rightful governors of the corporation, 
and shareholders are permitted a role only in the most extreme circumstances.  
The goal under federal law, by contrast, is to encourage shareholders to take 
a more active role in the governance structure.  And of course, more 
practically, if we want to award damages to specific investors to compensate 
them for their monitoring activities, that goal is not realized via derivative 
actions because damages are paid to the corporate entity. 
3.  Actual Reliance and Omissions 
Actual reliance claims may also be used to adopt a compromise position 
on omissions liability under section 10(b).  To understand why, it is necessary 
to trace the history of the presumption of reliance to the pre-Basic case of 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.333  There, the Supreme Court held 
that when a section 10(b) claim is predicated on a misleading omission rather 
than an affirmative false statement, it would be too difficult to expect 
investors to prove that they “relied” on missing facts.334  Instead, investors 
are entitled to a presumption that omitted material facts would have altered 
their investment decision.335  Defendants then have a right to rebut that 
presumption.336 
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Basic, after which most 
plaintiffs seeking a presumption of reliance chose to utilize fraud-on-the-
market rather than omissions liability.  However, in cases where an efficient 
market was lacking—and therefore Basic was unavailable—plaintiffs often 
sought a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute, leading to many 
disputes about whether claims concerned omissions or concerned affirmative 
false statements.337 
Some courts properly recognized that unless the plaintiff alleges that he or 
she actually read the document that omitted the relevant information, the 
Affiliated Ute presumption has little force.338  The logic is simple:  the 
presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute is rebutted if the defendant can 
 
 332. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048–49 (Del. 2004). 
 333. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 334. Id. at 152–53. 
 335. Id. at 153–54. 
 336. Id. 
 337. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999); Dodona I, LLC 
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 338.  See, e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Film Inv’rs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995); Shores 
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 
1159 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Affiliated Ute presumption is limited to face-to-face 
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show that had the truth been disclosed, the investor would not have behaved 
differently.  If the plaintiff never read the document, a disclosure could not 
have made a difference in the absence of a fraud-on-the-market claim (which, 
by hypothesis, is unavailable).  Thus, properly understood, Affiliated Ute 
should be limited to cases in which the investor actually read and relied upon 
the document from which information was omitted, limiting its utility in class 
actions. 
Omissions claims based purely on failure to comply with SEC disclosure 
requirements could be interpreted similarly.  Courts could permit such claims 
to proceed, but only for investors who demonstrate that they actually relied 
on the document that should have, but did not, contain the required 
information.  Such a compromise, subject to defendants’ right to prove that a 
disclosure would not have made a difference, would give courts more 
comfort that the claim is rooted in actual deception.  At the same time, it 
would provide those investors who engage in monitoring activities with 
additional incentives.  Better yet, corporations that omit information they 
previously stated that they would provide—an issue of growing importance 
in light of investors’ agitation for increased disclosure—could also incur 
liability to relying investors.  For maximum effectiveness, under this 
approach, if puffing statements continue to be treated as immaterial, courts 
should also conclude that puffing statements cannot legally qualify as 
adequate disclosures.  That is, if there is a requirement that certain 
information be disclosed, and the disclosure itself is deemed puffery, the 
company should be treated as having omitted required information under 
section 10(b), such that investors who actually read the document may pursue 
section 10(b) claims under Affiliated Ute.339 
4.  Claims for Securities Holders 
A more dramatic, and controversial, change would be to loosen the Blue 
Chip standing requirements for actual reliance claims.  Investors would be 
able to bring section 10(b) claims if they could show that had the truth been 
disclosed, they would have sold their holdings.  Such a shift in policy would, 
if coupled with “materialization of the risk” damages,340 allow greater 
recognition of the right to sell as part of a shareholder’s role in governance 
and as a mechanism by which investors discipline managers.  For most 
institutional investors, proof could likely come in the form of documented 
 
 339. Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act imposes liability for false statements 
contained in SEC filings and is only available to persons who can prove reliance on the 
misstatement. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2012).  However, section 18 would not provide an adequate 
substitute for the type of liability proposed here.  First, it does not, by its terms, provide liability 
for omissions.  Second, it requires the investor to prove that the misstatement impacted the 
security’s price.  Third, it only applies to documents filed with the SEC, and many corporate 
statements occur outside of SEC filings.  Finally, though there is little law on the subject, 
courts have assumed that damages are calculated as they would be for section 10(b). See, e.g., 
Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 340. Blue Chip operates in tandem with damages limitations; so long as the out-of-pocket 
rule applies to damages, investors who merely hold stock would not have a claim. See supra 
notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
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investment policies, thus mitigating the concern of the Blue Chip Court that 
proof regarding a failure to transact would be too speculative to entertain.341  
Moreover, because these claims would only be available in the actual reliance 
context, they could not be brought as a class (though, as above, they might 
be attached to class claims).  This, too, would mitigate the Blue Chip Court’s 
concern regarding “vexatious” lawsuits that force settlements with the threat 
of large damages.342 
B.  Imagining a Governance Right of Action 
All of these proposals, however, are not a complete fix, in part because 
they depend on the presence of an active investor.  Passive investing 
dominates today, and its market share is growing.343  Passive investors may 
well monitor and engage with management after making a purchase, but they 
do not make buy and sell decisions based on company-specific information.  
Therefore, the most radical potential change would be to allow investors to 
bring a claim for deceit if the misstatements influenced their engagement 
decisions, preventing them from mitigating (if not eliminating) their losses.  
No such claim is permissible under section 10(b), which only prohibits deceit 
“in connection with the purchase or sale” of a security.344  A new cause of 
action, however, would truly demonstrate federal law’s commitment to 
giving shareholders a voice in corporate governance. 
If a new statutory cause of action were crafted, it could require proof of 
direct reliance by the individual shareholder, but loosen the tight causation 
requirements of Rule 14a-9 and expand beyond misstatements in proxy 
solicitations.345  This way, passive investors, who cannot establish actual 
reliance in connection with a purchase or sale, could collect damages for 
interference with their governance rights, partly compensating them for their 
efforts on behalf of all investors. 
As with all claims rooted in actual reliance, one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks would be the expenses associated with the action in the absence of the 
potential for class certification.  But once again, if the particular claim is also 
associated with a fraud-on-the-market section 10(b) action, the litigation 
could be coordinated to minimize expenses.  Moreover, if the passive 
investors have large enough holdings, simple joinder with other investors, 
each of whom proves reliance individually, might be sufficient to make the 
actions cost efficient. 
 
 341. This claim, intended to encourage investors to correct corporate malfeasance, would 
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the stock in order to discourage purchases as the original Blue Chip plaintiffs alleged.  That 
way, at least some of the concern of the Blue Chip Court—that proof would be hard to come 
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Looking further down the road, we might also begin to consider a scheme 
where disclosure violations are penalized more heavily in firms that minimize 
shareholder governance rights (dual class stock, staggered boards, and so 
forth) on the theory that if shareholders have fewer levers of power, it is less 
appropriate to characterize them as enablers.  For example, Snap—the parent 
of Snapchat—recently held an initial public offering of stock that offers no 
voting rights.346  Investors in such companies must rely on buying, selling, 
and suing, to discipline management, making disclosures ever more critical.  
Moreover, where shareholders’ power is minimized, they are less responsible 
for corporate misbehavior, and courts need not harbor the same concerns that 
they may have tacitly encouraged it.  Thus, for such companies, ESG 
disclosures attesting to management quality and ethics could be treated as 
having particular importance, and puffery-like arguments could be especially 
disfavored.347 
CONCLUSION 
The more that the federal government retreats from substantive regulation 
of corporate behavior, the greater the potential for shareholders to fill the 
void.  It is far from ideal that shareholders—whose interests may differ from 
the broader society348—should occupy that role, but it may be the most viable 
near-term option.  Still, shareholders cannot fulfill that responsibility if the 
disclosures they rely upon are underenforced by courts relying on outdated 
distinctions between valuation and governance.  Long term, the solution may 
be to develop causes of action that are more specifically tailored to deception 
that influences how shareholders behave as corporate constituents.  Until 
then, there are potential changes to section 10(b) doctrine that can correct the 
problem and provide better support for federal policy, while still maintaining 
section 10(b)’s essential character as a claim rooted in deception. 
At least part of the problem for courts stems from the practical elimination 
of the reliance element from section 10(b) claims.  Without evidence of the 
actual reliance of particular investors, courts are forced to draw broad 
conclusions about information that investors may have relied upon, leading 
to rules of thumb designed to differentiate investors who were truly 
defrauded from those who are the architects of their own misfortune.  
Unfortunately, these rules encourage courts to paint a doctrinal portrait of a 
ruthlessly short-term wealth-maximizing shareholder that is, or appears to be, 
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at odds with many investor preferences and the project of enlisting 
shareholders as a restraining influence on corporate excess. 
There are legitimate reasons for softening the reliance requirement for 
open-market frauds, but the protective measures that have built up around 
that doctrinal shift are not necessary—and are in fact counterproductive—in 
certain contexts.  Moreover, the rise of institutional investors has made actual 
reliance claims more feasible, particularly when they can be tied to pending 
class actions.  Therefore, a solution that narrows situations in which 
statements are found to be immaterial as a matter of law, and that 
distinguishes between actual reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims, 
can better encourage investor monitoring and better enable investors to 
protect their interests. 
